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DIRECT DIAL NUMBER 
Dr. Phiph~t Tangsubkul 
SEAPOL Director 
Institute of Asian Studies 
Chulalongkorn University 
BANGKOK 
Thailand 
Dear Dr. Phiphat, 
2'1th Decomber 1937 
Herewith, as promised, please find enclosed my 
manuscript titled "A Synthesis of Thailand's Positions in 
the Light of the New Law of the Sea". It is approximate to 
what you have described, and hopefully introduces the main 
themes in the four problem areas you would like to have 
specifically emphasized. 
Incidentally, my Dutch Colleague from The Hague, 
Professor Ko Swan Sik of the T.M.C. ASSER Institute, plans 
to visit Bangkok next February 7-8, 1988, and I have recommended 
that he should meet with you. Please feel free to advise 
him about Thai legislation and documentation. 
SS/tt 
Encl: 
With best wishes for the New Year, 
Yours sincerely, 
\fort /v. &t.fiM/tj 
Sompong Sucharitkul 
Robert Short Professor of International Law 
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A SYNTHESIS OF THAILAND'S POSITIONS 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 
by 
SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL* 
I. GENERAL PURPOSE AND OBJECT 
This prelude serves as an overture to the study 
in greater depth of the policies and positions of THAILAND 
in regard to the new law of the sea. An endeavour is made in 
this introduction to project an overview of Thailand's 
stand on certain vital issues and questions raised by the 
new prospect and predicament. Thailand's standpoint is 
grounded on a variety of policy considerations. Her attitude 
is seasoned by the passage of time. Its formation is not 
altogether without trials and errors. In more areas than 
one, Thailand is indeed experiencing untold tribulations. 
This prologue is intended to foreshadow the overall results 
of concerted efforts to coordinate and harmonize the 
interests of various sectors of Thai society and to reconcile 
the views of competent agencies, participating in policy 
decision-making in the negotiating process of the new law 
of the sea. To a considerable extent, Thailand's national 
interests are closely affected by the changes envisioned 
in the recent U.N. Convention on the law of the Sea, 
2/ ... 
* Member of the Institute of International Law; Robert Short 
Professor of International Law at Notre Dame Law School; 
Contributing Collaborator of UNIDROIT. 
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Montego Bay, 1982. 1 ] This latest Convention takes the 
form of a codification package, of which the contents have 
been delicately balanced, the text intensely negotiated, 
the provisions carefully assembled and the instruments neatly 
put together with assured concordance for each of the 
official languages. This comprehensive treaty is meant 
to prescribe a uniform standard of State conduct, its rights 
and obligations in related fields for generations to come. 
It is often difficult to assess with reasonable 
precision the extent of a nations's awareness of the issues 
and problems facing its government in the wake of far-reaching 
progressive developments of rules of international law regarding 
the status and permissible use of the resources of the sea. 
The difficulty is multiplied in any attempt to evaluate 
the readiness, willingness and ability of a nation such 
as Thailand to cope with the new situation, entailing the 
unenviable task of comprehending the availability of potential 
wealth and resources and the intriguing mystery of the profound 
ocean floor. The sea has not ceased to provide a challenge 
for mankind. At the same time, it is a source of life 
and livelihood for sea-faring 
Thailand included. 
nations from time immemorial, 
As a coastal S~~te, Thailand has had to learn to 
defend herself against the continual waves of ,colonial 
expansion from afar, warding off one by one the onslaught 
of gunboat diplomacy, at its peak, from distant lands, 
stemming the ugliest tide of aggression from overseas with 
sword and plough, and repelling alien invading forces 
3/ ... 
1] The Law of the Sea, Official Text of the U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, New York, 1983. 
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by the combined use of her inner strength, popular resilience, 
national unity, cultural maturity_· and a touch of tactful 
diplomacy that is typically Thai. 
In terms of national security, the sea has not 
exactly served as a barrier to obstruct prospective intruders. 
Rather unkind to the host country, the ocean has opened 
several sea lanes to provide easy access to this hospitable 
"Land of a Thousand Smiles". Unlike some island kingdoms 
whose territorial integrity has been preserved virtually 
intact by the good grace of the cruel seas, the Kamikaze 
winds as well as treacherous rocks and under-currents, which 
time and again turned back or swept away hostile armadas, 
Thailand's axe-like pennisular position protruded by the 
warm shallow waters of her enticing Gulf lined by the 
silvery sand of her peaceful and friendly shores have increased 
rather than decreased her security risks. The right of 
transit passage presents a dilemma which must be viewed 
with the greatest caution. In this context, the adoption 
of a properly balanced compromise may better serve Thailand's 
security interests. 
Instead of presenting natural obstacles to would-
be trangressors from beyond the sea, the Gulf of Thailand 
has afforded a place of refuge for many a vessel in distress. 
Friends and foes alike have found Thai shores to be their 
ideal havens, complete with natural shelter, supply of 
fresh water, luscious food and luxuriant fruits in utter 
profusion. Popularly known as ''the rice bowl of Asia", 
Thailand has earned the reputation of an oldest and most 
experienced rice-growing community with expertise also in 
fish culture. Freedom of the sea means to the Thais freedom 
of navigation, freedom of overflight and freedom to fish. 
Fish and rice constitute the staple diet of the Thais for 
as long as memory of man can run. As the ancient description 
4/ ... 
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of the golden age of Sukhothai goes : 11 This land of the 
free is truly good. There are fish in the water and rice 
in the paddy... Thus has been the most vivid depiction 
of the peace and prosperity of Sul<:hothai Thailand, <vhile 
freedom and independence have always had to be defended 
and maintained, they first had also to be won and established. 
In this connection, food and agriculture have provided a 
crucial key to Thailand's success in achieving and furthering 
her healthy growth and economic development. Fishery 
constitutes a sector of primary importance in Thailand's 
agricultural extension program. This includes fresh-water, 
brackish water as well as salt water fish, shrimp, shell-
fish and sea-food of various species. Thailand is not only 
self-sufficient in food, but is also a major food exporter 
in grains and cereals as well as in sea-food, poultry 
and other sources of protein. In national planning, therefore 
fishery ranks second only to defence and security. The 
extended national jurisdiction over the 200 miles 
of' Exclusive Economic Zones implies a drastic curtailment 
of Thailand's traditional distant water fishing grounds. 
The Gulf of Thailand is also endowed with virtually 
untapped resources in minerals and natural gas. The country 
has only just begun to explore and exploit its off-shore 
non-living resources under the sea-bed. Considerable problems 
and complications have emerged in connexion with the 
new advanced technology of production,,management and distribution. 
Highly perplexing problems appear to have arisen in the 
del imi.ta t ion of maritime boundary. Without a clearly 
delineated line agreed upon by interested parties, all plans 
for exploration and exploitation of natural resources could 
not effectively proceed. It will be seen how in this 
particular area, Thailand has lost no time in starting 
negotiations and in reaching agreements with her neighbours, 
5/ ... 
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adjacent and opposite, in order to enable herself to implement 
whatever economic development plans the nation has devised 
for the exploitation of sub-marine areas bordering neighbouring 
States. 
Disputes are believed to be better avoided or prevent-
ed from arising than subsequently resolved or settled, 
in the same way as prevention seems more desirable than 
cure, as a matter of health-care policy. Thailand offers 
an interesting case study for experimentation in conflict 
resolution or pacific settlement of disputes. A restatement 
and clarification of Thailand's policy and position in this 
context appears to be warranted and timely. This may in 
turn serve to explain her attitude towards a number of important 
issues. 
Last but not least is the desirability of measures 
to be taken towards securing a pollution-free community. 
Conservation has been a constant theme in the policies respecting 
marine'environment. Clean air and unpolluted sea are clearly 
targets to be achieved through international cooperation. 
Abatement of activities generating pollution is only an 
initial step to ensure circulation of cleaner air and purer 
water in the ocean and the superjacent atmosphere. 
Leaving aside for the time being the feasibility 
of deep sea-bed mining and the international regime to be 
established for the management of the common heritage of 
mankind, this introduction is leading to a synthesis 
of policies and positions: adopted by Thailand in preparation 
for the entry into force of the impending Convention on 
on the Law of the Sea. It is proposed to examine ~he impact 
of the new law in as far as it touches and affects the national 
interests of Thailand in at least four interrelated principal 
6/ ... 
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areas, viz., 1) The Exclusive Economic Zone; 2) Transit Passage; 
3) Disput~Settlement; and 4) Marine Pollution. In each of these 
areas, it will be shown how Thailand has come to grip with the situation 
and learned to formulate her positions, taking into account the avail-
able alternatives and policy options. In this process, no nation 
can be said to be totally uninfluenced by considerations other than 
purely national interests. A number of pertinent factors, vital or 
material interests and other extraneous policy considerations have 
been scrutinized and carefully weighed before national position 
is formulated and finally taken on each pain~ not'without prior con-
sultations with nations or groups of nations sharing common positions, 
advantages and disadvantages. 
II. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
1. THAILAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
It has frequently been said that the new United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature at Montego 
Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, constitutes a historic milestone, 
marking the culmination of over 14 years of work, involving parti-
cipation of more than 150 countries, representing various regions 
of the world. These countries have different legal and political 
systems, and are in different stages of socio-economic development. 
They are countries with various dispositions regarding the types of 
minerals found in the sea-bed, including coastal States, geographic-
ally disadvanbtaged States, archipelagic States, island States and 
land-locked States. They all convened for the purpose of establish-
ing a comprehensive regime "dealing with all matters relating to 
the law of the sea, bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space 
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole." 
7 I . .. 
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The elaboration of the Convention represents an attempt to establish 
true universality in the effort to achieve a "just and equitable 
international economic order governing ocean space." 2] 
The Convention contains the constituent instruments of two 
major international organizations, namely, the Authority (articles 
156-191), including the Statute of the Enterprise (Annex IV), and 
the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(Annex VI : Statute). In addition, it represents not only the codi-
fication of customary norms, but also the progressive development 
of international law. The precise extent of the combination between 
codification of existing customary law and progressive development 
of new law depends on the moment of determination, as subsequent 
practice of States also operates to accelerate the ripening process 
of conventional law into an established custom. 
The concept of an exclusive economic zone (E.E.Z.) of two 
hundred nautical miles measured from the straight baselines of a 
coastal State is relatively new. Whatever the degree of novelty and 
regardless of the precise moment of crystallisation, it cannot now 
be gainsaid that E.E.Z. is not here to stay as a generally accepted 
norm of international law, endorsed by the practice of States evidenc-
ing the emergence of new rules of customary international law. 3] 
8/ ... 
2] See Introduction to the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, ibid., 
at p. XIX. 
3] See, e.g., Ted L. Mcdorman, "Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim 
of 200-Mile Zones", Ocean Development and International Law, 
Vol. 16, No.2, pp. 183-209, at pp. 187-188. 
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Without at this stage taking issues with any of the proposit-
ions relating to the comprehensiveness or finality of the Convention 
of 1982 or the proportion between the parts that are customary law 
and those involving substantial modifications by treaty provisions 
binding on parties, Thailand is well aware of the inexhaustiveness 
and transitory character of any man-made norms. As a Buddhist nation, 
Thailand understands the intertemporal character of international 
law, which moves and continues to grow with the movement or passage 
of time. The Convention of 1982 represents an accelerated and timely 
growth of the corpus juris oceaniJ a ceaseless and continuing 
process in progress since time immemorial, especially precipitated 
by the Codification Conferences of 1958 and 1960. 
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is unprecedented 
in its wholesomeness or indivisibility of its component parts. It 
is a compact integral whole. Other significant features, such as 
the number of sessions or the length of time it took to reach agreement 
on the finalisation of the negotiating text, are no longer unique 
as most contemporary codification conferences are now attended by 
as many delegations although not as large and as lengthy in terms 
of the duration of the conference. In this connection, the process 
of multilateral treaty-making has been reviewed and standardized in 
a report of the working group, adopted by the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly in 1984 4] after eight years of studies and 
deliberations by experts in the field. The techniques used in the 
recent Convention of 1982 are relatively new, but the novelty reflects 
only variations of existing practice without drastically departing 
from pre-existing methods. The provisions confirming existing practice 
have been drawn freely from the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the 
LavJ of the Sea 5] and even earlier exercises such as the Harvard 
9/ ... 
4] Report of the Working Group on the Review of Multilateral Treaty 
Making Process, A/C.6/39/L/2, November 27, 1984. 
5] The Work of the International Law Commission, 3rd edition, U.N., 
New York, 1980, pp. 140-165. 
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Research in the 1930's. 6] Indeed, none of the existing rules has 
been omitted or overlooked, some although largely outmoded were 
embodied without much discussion, while new areas and new concepts 
were initiated and negotiated by representatives of governments without 
the benefit of legal expertise and draftsmanship of the International 
Law Commission. Real political and economic bargaining and negotia-
tions wre conducted admidst the acceptance of the bulk of the entire 
body of existing laws and customs of the sea, the corpus juris 
oceani. 
Gradually maritime jurisdiction of a coastal State has been 
extending by leaps and bounds, from straight baselines, including 
widening bays and enlarged jurisdiction around islands, to 
differences in the growing width of territorial waters from three 
nautical miles canon-shot rule to four Scandinavian marine leagues 
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1950) 7] and thence to the 
exclusive fishery zone of 50 miles in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case (Merits), U.K. v. Iceland (1974) 8] and ultimately the 
200-mile E.E.Z. 9] 
Thailand has not been insensitive to these changes. One 
of her illustratious international jurists, Dr. Thanat Khoman, 
was an active member of the International Law Commission in the late 
1950's when the draft articles on the Law of the Sea were discussed. 
Prince Wan Waithayakorn, Krommun Naradhip Bongsaprabhand, President 
10/ ... 
6] See, e.g., Harvard Draft, 29 A.J.I.L. Sepcial Supp. (1935). 
7] I.C.J. Report, 1951, pp. 116 et seq. 
8] I.C.J. Report, 1974, pp. 3 et seq. 
9] See, e.g., Article 57 of the Convention, Breadth of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone. 
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of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, was elected President 
of the First and Second Conferences on the Law of the Sea, Geneva 
1958 and 1960. The notion of the sea being a common heritage of man-
kind was warmly embraced by Prince Wan already in 1958 as he accept-
ed the presidency of the First L.O.S. Conference. 10] Two hundred 
miles zone has become a living nightmare for Thai fishermen and fish-
ing industry from the very start, ever since Professor Francois, 
the Dutch Special Rapporteur, suggested in one of his earlier reports 
to the International Law Commission that coastal States should be 
given the right to adopt fishery conservation measures within a 200-
mile zone off their coasts. These measures were to be binding on 
other States which could submit their disputes to the International 
Court of Justice if found to be unjustified. This suggestion was 
made in 1951, 11] one year before the famous Santiago Declaration 
of ''mar patrimonial" of 200 miles by Chile, Peru and Ecuador. 12] 
For the protection of the living resources of the sea, the Special 
Rapporteur carne to the conclusion that the diversity of circumstances 
in which conservation measures could ideally be taken in the various 
parts of the world and with respect to different species was such 
that the coastal State in each situation is in the best position to 
take necessary rneasure$j having regard to existing bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties. 
11 I . .. 
10] First Plenary Session, Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 
February 24, 1958, P.V. p. 3, para 37. 
11] U.N. document A/CN.4/42, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1951, Vol.II, p. 88, para 80. 
121 Andres Aguilar, "The Patromonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept''. 
San Diego Law Review, 1974, pp. 571-602. 
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Subsequent events and in particular the 1958 and 1960 
Conferences on the Law of the Sea were highlighted by further efforts 
on the part of coastal States and island States, especially archi-
pelagic States, to enclose certain areas of the highseas as lying 
within their exclusive fishery jurisdiction Indonesia and the 
Philippines provide clear illustrations of archipelagic States. 13] 
The 1960's were marked by the rapid development, by a limited number 
of countries, some of them developing countries such as Thailand and 
the Republic of Korea, of long-ranging fishing fleets operating 
throughout the oceans of the world. In addition, the traditional 
capacity of developed countries such as Japan, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. 
which have long engaged in distant-water as well as deep-sea fishing 
in pratically every sea around the globe, the distant-water fishing 
industries in the handful of the developing world put up consider-
able investments and efforts to this end, resulting in overfishing 
in the many areas of the Pacific, the Atlantic and the North Sea. 
In most cases, regional fishery commissions lacked the power and 
the economic and political wills to prevent or slow down the decline 
and collapse of important fish stocks. 14] Other developing 
countries, lacking the financial means and practical experience, 
and fearing depletion of existing stocks within their reach before 
they could begin to exploit them, naturally reacted to the prospect 
of over-fishing by extending their protective exclusive fishing zone 
to 200 miles, a trend that has since been difficult to resist, let 
alone to reverse. Thailand did her utmost to resist the irresistible 
trend which ultimately swept her along with Japan and Korea from their 
feet. For all that, she supports the Convention for what it is worth, 
believing that the existence of an international regime provides 
greater protection for developing countries than the primitive state 
of lawlessness, in which the weak must succumb to the gunboats of 
the strong. 
12/ ... 
13] For instance, Indonesia already presented the archipelagic concept 
at the 1958 Conference, and proceeded to grant licences 
to foreign fishing vessels in 1968 as soon as the U.N. seabed 
sub-committee was established. 
14] See, e.g., Jean Carroz, the Management of Humanity's Resources: 
The Law of the Sea, Workshop 1981. Hague Academy of International 
and U.N. University 1980. 
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2. THAILAND'S POSITION IN REGARD TO THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
The statistical data staring into Thailand's face portends 
a frightening prospect of neighbouring coastal States enforcing their 
exclusive economic zones to the extent of excluding Thai fishing fleets 
from these zones which used to serve as Thailand's distant-water fish-
ing grounds. Indeed, the figure of 99 per cent of total world 
catch of fish from within 200 miles exclusive economic zones of 
coastal States was most alarming. 
The upsurge of Thailand's fishing industries, placing 
the country as the leading distant-water fishing nation in South-
East Asia, may be a source of national pride, but it is equally 
a rootcause of chronic migrain for those responsible for policy-
planning and decision-making in connexion with aquaculture, 
fishery management and export of sea-food product. 
Thailand's emergence as one of the top ten fishing 
nations of the world in the 1970's coincided with the initial 
implementation of the 200-mile exclusive fishery zone. The 
trawling techniques in distant-water fishing for shrimps and 
other surface water species have been learned principally from 
Japanese fishery schools and from training institutions on the 
west coast of North America, with the result that for a few recent 
decades (1950-1080) Thailand's Fishery Department and Thai 
Delegation to fishery conferences could consult more closely 
with their Japanese counterparts without the aid of inter-
pretation. In more ways than one, as distant-water fishing 
nations, Japan and Thailand are sharing a similar fate. It 
should not come as a surprise that, in the circumstances, 
Thailand could learn very useful and interesting lessons from 
Japan's position and practice. The fates of the two nations 
are similar but by no means common. 
13/ ... 
' .
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a) E.E.Z. viewed as most damaging to Thailand's fishing interests 
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted 
as a package without any possibility of reservation for any of 
its provisions. It is a Treaty that must either be accepted 
in toto or rejected. Thailand cannot afford not to accept it 
regardless of whatever minor abatement she could introduce in 
the negotiating process. 
In this context, the E.E.Z. appears to be the most dread-
ed portion of the Convention from Thailand's standpoint. Observ-
ing the practice of States, it can be seen that within the region 
Thailand was decidedly the very last State to make any move towards 
claiming her own E.E.Z. The position taken by Japan and its 
timing may have served as a cue for Thailand to react. Being 
among the very few nations that have been heavily engaged in 
distant-water fishing, Thailand is included in a small minority 
group among coastal States. 
The concern for Thailand's vital interests in the new 
law of the sea was discernible from her active participation 
in the F'irst Committee's discussicm of the regime of the sea-
bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction in 1967, 16] 
1r1hich accounted for Thai land's designation by the First Committee 
Chairman, Ambassador F'ami (Egypt), as member of the seabed sub-
committee established as a stepping stone along the path leading 
to the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus, during 
an early session of UNCLOS III in 1974, although to no avail, 
Thailand endeavoured to have her status recognized as a 
14/ ... 
16] Ambassador Joe Pardo of Malta introduced this item in 
the First Committee of the General Assembly during its regular 
session in 1967. Australia and Thailand cooperated closely 
at committee level. The main problem then was deep-sea mining and 
and the concept of the common heritage of mankind. 
SUCHARITKUL/14 
geographically disadvantaged State. 17] Up to the final round 
of the Third LOS Conference in April 1982, Thai Delegation still 
hoped for a miracle in this particular connexion. Thus, a 
proposal by Za1re was supported by Thailand. This would have 
entitled States to the surplus of living resources in a coastal 
State's extended zone even where the coastal State in fact did 
not reach its harvesting capacity and a surplus resulted. 18] 
This proposal did not find sufficient support and was not actively 
pursued during the last negotiating session. 
Thailand has had to be content with whatever improvements 
could successfully be introduced into the text of the provi-
sions of the new law of the sea to alleviate the plight of 
Thai fishermen in distant-waters. Apart from possible access ' 
to the surplus allowable catch, paragraph .3 of Article 62 entails 
a mitigating effect by obliging the coastal State to take into 
account "the requirements of developing States in the subregion 
and region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to 
minimize dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually 
fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in 
research and identificati~ of stocks." 19] 
15/ ... 
17] Thailand suggested that there should be a sharing of the 
living resources in an extended zone on an equitable basis 
and a right of compensation for those States which would 
become zone-locked by neighbouring extended zones and 
thereby deprived of an economic benefit once enjoyed. 
UNCLOS III, official Records, Vol. 1, July 10, 1974, p. 
147 and Vol. II, August 1, 1974, p. 192. 
18] See comments by Mr. Sucharitkul, Thai Delegate, in the 
170th Plenary Meeting, UNCLOS III, April 16, 1982, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.62/SR. 170/22, April 1980, pp.6-8. Zaire's 
Draft Amendment to Article 62 in U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L. 
107, April 13, 1982. 
19] Article 62 (3), A/Conf.62/122, October 7, 1982, reprinted 
in 21 I.L.M. (1982), pp. 1261 et seq. 
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Article 73 (Enforcement of Laws and Regulations of the 
Coastal State) may be viewed as affording some measure of relief 
for Thai fisherme~ vessels and crews. Paragraph 2 stipulates 
that ''arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released 
upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security." 20] 
Paragraph 3 provides that ''coastal State penalties for violation 
of fishery laws and regulations in the zone may not include 
imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by 
the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment."21] 
Paragraph 4 requires the coastal State in case of arrest or 
detent, ion of foreign vessels to "promptly notify the flag State, 
through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any 
penalties subsequently imposed." 22] 
17 I . .. 
20] See, ibid., Article 73. 
21] Article 72, paras (2) and (3) appear to reduce appreciably! 
the hardship suffered by Thai fishing fleets and their~ 
At any rate, the vessels and crews could be released tCr.ews .-
forthwith upon posting of reasonable bond or other securlt~~ 
The practice in the recent decades has been most unkind 
to Thai fishermen, especially Burma, Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and even Malays~a. Negotiations were often 
protracted and fishermen detained as well as the fishing 
vessel~ and catches confiscated. 
22] The incident involving "The Changyee'' is notorious. This 
was a research fishing vessel provided by Japan to the 
Southeast Asian Fishery Centre (Singapore base), complete 
with Japanese teaching staff and crew. The trainees were 
nationalsof member States of the Southeast Asian region. 
They were\. detained in Burma for months on end despite 
collective and official protests from the Centre and member 
States. 
·' 
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b) Policy options and measures to abate damages to fishing industry 
Apart from the humanitarian principles contained in 
Article 73 toning down the harshness of penalties and measures 
taken by coastal States in the enforcement of their laws and 
regulations which could entail correctional or remedial effect 
for the tail end of the sufferings by fishermen, and the remote 
possibility of Thailand ever beDefiting from the agreements 
and arrangements to be negotiated with other coastal States in 
the subregion or region, Thailand seems to be doomed to drastic 
cuts in her distant-water fishing activities and severe limitat-
ions on her total annual catch, subject to costly licensing expens-
es and procedures as well as hard bargains driven by other coastal 
States. These factors will add to the increasing costs and growing 
risks involved in the harvest, production and marketing. Against 
this backdrop of prohibitive forces, the Thai Government does 
not have many alternatives aside from a few policy options that 
will have to be more energetically and relentlessly pursued 
in order to abate the tragic losses if not altogether to avoid 
them. The measures taken by Japan might be emulated. 
(1) Quest for more scientific data regarding 
stocks and aquaculture 
The need is badlY' felt to learn all about stocks of 
I 
various species of interest to the Thai fishing industries;i~p~r~~w(ar 
their origins, growth, movements, habits 
as well as their cultivation and recycling incentives to promote 
optimum utilisation of allowable catch to be determined for 
the areas within Thailand's extended zones including the 200-
mile E.E.Z. This may represent the last retreat back into waters 
within Thailand's national jurisdiction. With all the Thai 
expertise available to international organizations and specialized 
18/ ... 
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agencies such as FAO 23] and OAU 24], "Ayudhaya is not without 
good men", as the saying goes. But alas, what has happened 
to Ayudhya? Disunity caused by outdated bureaucracy has chased 
away better brains in order to make room at the top for lesser 
minds to prosper. Brain-drain from Thailand has helped the world 
where it is most needed. Yet it should be pointed out that for 
a long time to come Thailand herself stands in greatest need 
of such expertise. It is regrettable ,that vJhi le, the Government 
would stop at nothing to unquestioningly secure the services of 
foreign experts, the internationally recognized qualities of 
her own native specialists are ignored and overlooked. With 
her back against the wall, Thailand has no choice but to learn 
to rise above local political bickering and demestic professional 
jealousy, when in fact far more fundamental national interests 
are at stake. Statistics may be consulted in regard to Japan's 
enlightened approach to similar problems confronting that island 
nation. Japan's determination, sound scientific research and 
good planning have enabled Japanese fishermen to maintain the 
existing level of overall annual catch of over 10 million tons, 
fully compensating the 60 per cent reduced tonnage of catch from 
the extended exclusive fishery zones of other coastal States, 
19/ ... 
23] The fishery experts of FAO, for instance, are principally 
Thai nationals, Dr. Aphorn, Dr. Thep and Dr. Vidhya enriched 
the fishery expertise of that Specialized Agency of the 
United Nations. 
24] Dr. Sawang Charoenphol, former Director-General of the 
Fishery Department of Thailand, on the other hand, has 
been lending his expert professional advice and services 
to countries like Ehiopia and Djibouti in the Red Seas 
and other areas far away from Thailand. 
25] A Thai scholar in Japan rather kept his discovery to himself 
than publish the findin~ for his doctoral dissertation 
to a Japanese Fishery School. 
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notably the U.S.A., Canada, Korea and the U.S.S.R., by proportionally 
increasing her allowable catch off Japanese coasts with repopulat-
ed and recycled species within Japan's extended zones with 
sufficient flexible margin to spare. This goal has been achieved 
by Japan through various means at its disposal, namely, nego-
tiations and friendly persuasions rather than chancing confrontation 
and experimenting with conflict resolution. 26] Whatever losses 
Japan has had to sustain as the result of the extension of foreign 
E.E.Z.'s, the public and private sectors of Japan have collective-
ly succeeded in overcoming them. Thailand's analogous problems 
may not have been as colossal in terms of magnitude, she never-
theless needs to learn the hard facts of international life and 
to divert her attention from national disunity. In more ways 
than one, Thailand's geographical positions have lowered her 
odds in this context, with her semi-enclosed sea in the gulf 
of Siam and limited access to the Anderman Sea. The disadvantages 
of Thailand's coastlines are to be contrasted with the insular 
character of Japanese archipelago, surrounded by waters from 
all directions, thus blessed with larger elbow and leg room 
for manoeuvre. 
(2) Request for external assistance 
Against this dim prospect of a lone sufferer in the region, 
Thailand should lose no time to initiate the process of request 
20/ ... 
26] Japan has long been engaged in distant-water as well as 
deep-sea fishing. Japanese societies have been able to 
conclude all kinds of arrangements, through joint-ventures 
or other cooperative techniques, allowing Japanese fishermen 
time to phase out of foreign exclusive economic zones while 
regaining greater harvest within her own waters, without 
seriously adversely affecting the status quo an~e. 
SUCHARITKUL/20 
for external assistance from s~npathetic and friendly nations 
of the developed world as well as from international organizations 
such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies witt1 
competence in some of the technical fields found to be different 
and most wanting in the areas under Thailand's national juris-
diction. In this connexion, a country most likely to appreciate 
the problem facing Thailand is probably Japa~ which could give 
sound and valid practical advic~ both in regard to technical 
and also financial assistance, as Japan is a big importer of 
sea-food product from Thailand. Other developed nations friendly 
to Thailand and sympathetic to her plight include Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, the U.S.A., the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. 
The United Nations through its regional commission, ESCAP, and 
its specialized agencies, competent in the relevant fields, 
notably FAO, UNESCO, WMO and WHO could in their own specialist 
ways contribute to the alleviation of Thailand's problems. Above 
all, however, Thailand must be reminded of the dire need for 
information and assistance, and must start to learn to appreiate 
and welcome meaningful cooperation both in the technology of 
a_quaculture, conservation measures, production management 
and marketing. Financial assistance and contribution in joint-
ventures should not be ruled out. Regional centres for research 
and training should be further promoted with Japan or other 
developed countries as donor. 27] 
27] 
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The South East Asia Centre for Fishery Development with 
one department in Smutprakarn and another in Singapore 
should be updated to cope with new situations. 
(3) Negotiations with neighbouring coastal States 
Thai fishermen suffered the most in their activities 
in nearby waters off the coast of more or less immediately adjacent 
.J_ 
neighbouring St~tes• including Burma, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam, where Thai fishing vessels have been arrest-
ed and confiscated and their crews detained and sentenced to 
varying prison terms. Valuable catches, regardless of the areas 
of the catch, ~1ere also confiscated along with the vessels and 
fishing gear~ if found within the national jurisdiction of 
neighbouring countries. The past experience has been painful 
and the plight of fishermen only an after-thought. No effective, 
preventive or cooperative measures have been successfully taken. 
Thai fishermen must either do or die, either fish in foreign 
unfriendly waters and risk prison terms or be deprived of tradi-
tional means of livelihood. Their acquired fishing habits have 
not been recognized as acquired rights. Admittedly, the application 
of new rules should not dislocate habitual fishing activities 
of friendly neighbours. Amicable terms should be reached to 
permit a graceful transition of gradual withdrawal. 
Article 51, paragraph 1 of the 1982 Convention merely 
recognized "traditional fishing rights'' of "irrunediately adjacent 
neighbours'', but gives no special rights to States that are 
not "immediately adjacent". Whatever the definition of "immediately 
adjacent neighbour", Thailand should be qualified under this 
provision with regard to Indonesian archipelagic waters. The 
Philippines may be less than "immediately adjacent neighbour". 
Nevertheless, both Indonesia and the Philippines have benefited 
from Thailand's strong support of the "archipelagic concept" 
in the negotiation stage. Now is the time for Indonesia and the 
Philippines as fellow founding members of ASEAN to accord a more 
favoured treatment to Thai fishermen, especiallY those who have 
traditionally fished in their waters. Thai trawlers could not 
benefit substantially from the archipelagic waters of the Philippines 
22/ ... 
SUCHARITKUL/22 
or Indonesia, nor could the Philippines or Indonesia benefit 
much from Thai trawling experiences. Malaysia on the other 
hand has concluded an arrangement with Indonesia.28] Thailand 
has been rather slow and inactive in this particular regard. 
Her lack of enthusiasm for the E.E.Z. provisions did not trigger 
her abstention in voting on the final text of the Convention. 
Strangely enough, it was more her wish to remain faithful to 
the United States to the last hours and thereby hopefully to 
be able subsequently to persuade the United States to re-
enter the world mari·time community by participating in the inter-
national regime to be set up for deep sea-bed mining that, to 
the incredulous amazement of ASEAAN colleagues, precluded Thailand 
from voting for the Convention. 29] It should be observed, 
however, that reason. and ASEAN solidarity ultimately prevailed 
and Thailand joined her true friends in the region in signing 
the Convention on December 10, 1982. 30] In any event, no 
23/ ... 
28] See, e.g., Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia 
relating to the legal regime of archipelagic State and 
rights of Malaysia in the territorial sea, archipelagic 
waters as well as in the airspace above the territorial 
sea, archipelagic waters, and the territory of the Republic 
of Indonesia lying between East and West Malaysia, done at 
Jakarta, February 25, 1982, entered into force, May 1984. 
See B.A. Hamzak, "Indonesia's Archipelagic Regime : Implications 
for Malaysia", Marine Policy 8 (1984), pp. 30-43. 
29] The Thai Delegation had earlier been working closely with 
ASEAN colleagues and Delegations friendly to the U.S.A., 
such as Canada and Australia, to endeavour to persuade the 
U.S. Delegation to vote positively in favour of the text 
of the Convention. 
30] The Deputy Foreign Minister of .. _Thailand, Dr. Arun Panupong.J 
himself signed the Final Act and the Convention at Montego 
Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982. 
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amount of persuasive articulation by ASEAN friends and NATO allies 
could dissuade the U.S. Government from adhering to considerations 
of short-term national interests as conceived by the United 
States under current administration. 
Initiatives should have been taken already in th,e mid 
1970's to reach some arrangements or agreements with all 
of Thailand's neighbours, in whose extended zones, Thai fishermen 
had been engaged in distant-water fishing. The situation should 
not have gone unnoticed nor allowed to deteriorate. If Japan 
could reach agreement with the United States for a five-year 
phase-out period, why could not Thailand with Malaysia? Have 
we exiled all the good men of Ayudh.ya? 
To be up to the task, it requires more than the knowledge, 
willingness and skill to negotiate. All the sectors concerned 
should put their heads together, working side by side, simul-
taneously and concurrently but harmoniously with proper 
coordination between the private sectors within Thailand, the 
Fishing Industries, the Exporting Traders, the Conservation Storage, 
etc., and the various government departments concerned, the Fishery 
Department, the External Trade Department and the Economic 
Department as well as the Treaty Department in the Ministries 
concerned should work together to reach several levels of under-
standing, cooperation, and arrangements, both as treaties 
and as joint-venture agreements to sooth the pain and reduce 
the sufferings of Thai fishing industries. 
Proposals have been made for closer collaboration between 
Thai private sectors with the South Pacific islands States, 
members of the Pacific Forum, for joint-venture in the manufactur-
ing of tuna canning product to be re-exported to countries such 
as the United States. The time has come and the opportunity 
is ripe for such inter-regional cooperation, befitting the 
24/ ... 
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enterprising character of the Thais as pioneering nation. 31] 
3. THAILAND'S EXPECTATION AND PERFORMANCE 
Any enlightened government in Thailand's position will 
have to strive relentlessly to struggle for the survival of the 
country as a fishing nation, whose livelihood and export earnings 
have substantially depended on fishery. One courageous Prime 
Minister of Thailand had to resign in 1979, following the decision 
to increase tax on diesel oil, directly affecting the fate of 
Thai fishing industries. If Thai farmers are the backbones 
of the country, Thai fishermen constitute the principal blood 
vessels which must keep the body of the Thai nation alive and 
in good form. 
Several problems of fundamental importance must be faced 
squarely. The Government cannot afford to look the other way. 
Unemployment must be alleviated, over-fishing discouraged, and 
decline in fishing industry upsetting coastal fishing communities, 
with resulting loss of export earning and decline in G.N.P. 
will all have be amply compensated, if Thailand were to recover 
from this serious setback. 
25/ ... 
31] Proposals have been made, especially from the South Pacific 
island nations as recent as August 1987 in Hawaii that 
Thailand should join foce with the island States with their 
extended jurisdiction in the management and production of 
cannea tuna for export. 
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The coming decade is inevitably a painful period for 
reshaping and readjusting the distant-water overcapacity fleet 
and industry to fit the restricted fishing grounds in the 200-
mile zone of Thailand. Unlike Japan and the U.S.S.R., Thailand 
is neither a developed country nor an industrialized State. 
The current trends since UNCLOS III have concentrated upon the 
problems of promoting coastal State fisheries expertise such 
as Burma, India and Bangladesh within their E.E.Z.s and of re-
structuring distant-water fleets of developed or industrialized 
States, such as the U.S.A., the U.K. and Norway. Thailand stands 
virtually alone, with the exception of Korea, and must devise 
her own plan to cope with the disruption of her fishing industry. 
In particular, Thai fishery· may have to be reoriented 
in diversified directions guided by numerous considerations. 
(1) Coastal aquaculture and inland fisheries provide the 
potential to maintain and even increase the export market at 
its current levels and ensure the continuous supply of marketable 
fresh fish for human consumption. Other alternative industrial 
use of low-quality catches from the sea should be transformed 
into fish meal for animal or poultry feed. No wastage should 
be permitted. Fresh water fisheries and coastal aquaculture 
should be further developed in close cooperation with China and 
Japan for inland species such as salmon and trout as well as 
for brackish water shrimp-culture and coastal species. In this 
connexion, scientific research and marine biology should support 
the studies and experiments to recycle and increase the stocks 
within Thai waters, in order to make up for lost grounds. 
(2) Negotiations should be conducted with the view to conclud-
ing agreements and arrangements with Thailand's coastal neighbours, 
notably Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, 
Bangladesh and India to allow Thai fishing fleets to fish under 
26/ ... 
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licence in the E.E.Z. 's of these neighbouring countries, includ-
ing archipelagic waters. Arrangements at governmental level 
must also be followed up by cooperation at the private sectors 
levels, which may take different forms of joint-ventures. Honesty 
is the best policy. All partners should benefit equitably from 
the ventures. Mistakes and misunderstandings should be avoided. 
Malpractices and misfeasances should not be repeated. In no cir-
cumstances should Thai fishing vessels be allowed or encouraged 
by Thai authorities to fish in the coastal waters of Thailand's 
neighbours without authorization or licence, thus preventing 
or pre-empting potential friction in the absence of joint-venture 
or other forms of arrangements for mutual benefits. This will 
discourage illegal fishing by Thai fishermen in neighbouring 
waters, which shows the integrity of Thai fishermen in disreput-
able light and places the Thai government in an embarrasing and 
costly position of having to intervene to post bond for the release 
of the crews and vessels from foreign courts, assuming that the 
Convention is implemented. 
(3) Cooperation within the region or sub-region should be 
promoted with Thailand partiipating as full partners in any regional 
or sub-regional programme such as ASEAN or the Mekong Committee, 
or indeed the Southeast Asian region with Japan as donor country. 
Cooperation with other regions should not be precluded. Attention 
may be paid to overtures being made by the South Asian Asso-
ciation for Regional Cooperation and the Pacific Forum. \tJith 
adequate experience and credentials in appropriate specialization, 
Thailand could qualify as efficient partner or collaborator in 
fishing industries, such as canning, cold storage and fishery 
conservation and management to enhance potentials and enrich 
fishing grounds in various zones. 
(4) For the government of Thailand, the internal problems 
are manifold. Unemployment of fishermen needs to be tackled. 
Forward planning is needed in anticipation of eventual dislocation 
27 I ... 
of fishermen and the employees in the fishing industries. Fisher-
men may have to find other employment or follow other pursuits. 
Larger budget is needed to boost the Department of Fisheries 
to meet new responsibilities for fisheries management, scientific 
information gathering, aquaculture development and enforcement. 
The Government needs re-education through more and better scientific, 
social and economic information to formulate a balanced plan 
for the future of Thai fisheries. 
(5) In anticipation of Thailand's ratification of the 1982 
LOS Convention, 32] a series of legislative acts will be need-
ed either in the form of general enabling act or specialized 
fields of legislation including detailed ministerial regulations, 
to implement the 1981 E.E.Z. proclamation by Thailand. The 
:Fisheries Legislation 1 of 1947 needs revision and restructuring. 
In this particular connexion, the Asian African Legal Consultative 
Committee, of which Thailand has been active member since 1961, 
should be closely consulted, in order to adopt timely and appro-
priate measures in harmonious coordination and cooperation with 
other coastal countries with the larger regions of Asia and Africa, 
without overlooking the legislative measures by other coastal 
States in the North and South as well as East Pacific regions. 
The European Community also provides excellent models for legislation 
in regard to the E.E.Z., Community as ~rmll as individual member 
State of the Community. 331 
28i . .. 
32] For an opinion in support of Thailand's ratification of 
the Convention, see, e.g., Ted. L. Mcdorman, "Thailand 
and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention", Marine Policy 
9 (1985). 
33] See, e.g., the fisheries arrangement between Spain and 
France and the friction that followed between Spaniards 
and French fisherm~n. See also Haruhiro Fukui, "How Japan 
Handled UNCLOS Issues : Does Japan Have an Ocean Policy?" 
in R. L. Friedheim, Japan and the N8w Ocean Regime, Boulder, 
Colo., Westview Press, 1984, pp. 45 et seq. 
. ·, 
.. , 
' ·.~ 
• ·.? 
SUCHARITKUL/LJ 
III. TRANSIT PASSAGE 
1. TRADITIONAL STAND OF THAILAND ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 
AND TRANSIT PASSAGE 
If, as has been seen, Thailand's contribution to the 
three Conferences on the Law of the Sea and even in the preparation 
of draft articles is not negligible, it must be added that Thai-
land's positions regarding freedom of navigation and the right 
of transit passage must have been clear to historians from 
Grotian time. In the wake of the theoretical debates between 
Hugo Grotius' ''!."1are Liberum" and Lord Seldon's "Mare Clausum", 
Thailand appears to have opted for freedom of the high seas, 
freedom of navigation, free flow of commerce and the right of 
free passage through territorial waters and international water-
ways. The Treaty between Thailand and the Netherlands of June 
12, 1617, 34] facilitating commercial exchanges between the 
two countries testifies to Thailand's stand in favour of freedom 
of commerce and navigation. 
The right of transit passage, as recently developed 
and endorsed in the LOS Convention Package, is something relatively 
new and is not automatically accorded or available to those remain-
ing outside the new regime of ocean law. It does contain a novel 
element that is significant and vital to the strategic position 
and national security of all nations, large and small, rich and 
poor, coastal and land-locked alike. 
34] 
29/ ... 
See, e.g., G.W. Gong, "The Standard of 'Civilization' in 
International Society", Oxford, 1984, especially at p. 
203. See also Sumet Jumsai, "The First Siamese Embassy 
in Europe", the Voice of the Nation, Bangkok, February 
17, I974, p.4. 
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A balanced approach to this important notion of "transit 
passage" requires a basic comprehension of allied notions which 
have to be frontally faced. Without an exhaustive analysis of 
the different r~gimes of various portions of the sea or ocean, 
such as the high seas, the territorial seas, the archipelagic 
waters, archipelagic sea lanes, international straits and E.E.Z.s, 
an understanding of some basic concepts is essential to any intro-
duction to this delicate and controversial subject of "TRANSIT 
PASSAGE". These notions include "passage'', "trasit passage", 
"innocent passage" and "archipelagic sea lane passage" as well 
as in terms of jural relationship , viz., the ''right of passage'', 
"right of transit passage", ''right of innocent passage" and "right 
of archipelagic sea lane passage". 
a. Different Types of Passage 
1. "Passage" jn the context of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, means navigation 
through the territorial sea for the purpose either of traversing 
through that sea without entering international waters, or of 
proceeding to international waters, or of making for the high 
seas from internal waters. 35] This definition is reiterated 
in Article 18 (1) of the 1982 Convention. Paragraph 2 of Article 
18 clarifies this definition further by requiring passage to 
be "continuous and expeditions". However, passage may include 
"stopping and anchoring", but only ''in so far as the same are 
incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by 
force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance 
to persons, ships or aircrafts in danger or distress." 36] 
30/ ... 
35] See Article 14 (2) and (3) of the Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958; 
The Work of the International Law Commission, Third Edition, 
U.N .. New York, 1980, pp. 140-147. 
36] See Article 18 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982, U.N. Publication, New York, 1983, at p.18. 
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Freedom of the high seas, on the other hand, is much 
more comprehensive than the right of passage. It comprises 
inter alia, freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom 
to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and freedom to overfly 
the high seas. 37] 
2. "Transit passage" means, under Article 38 (Right of 
transit passage) of the 1982 LOS Convention, "the exercise 
in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and 
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious 
transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of conti-
nuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through 
the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning 
from a State bordering a strait, subject to the condition of 
entry to that State." 38] 
3. "Innocent passage", under Article 14 of the Geneva 
Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958. means 
any passage "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order and security of the coastal State 'and such passge' shall 
take place in conformity with these articles and with other rules 
of international lat.:J. '' 39] Under Article 19 of LOS Convention 
31/ ... 
37] See Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 
April 29, 1958, the Work of the International Law Commission, 
Third Edition, U.N., New York, 1980, pp. 147-155, at p. 
147. Compare Article 87 (Freedom of the High Seas) of the 
1982 LOS Convention, U.N. Publication, New York, 1983 
at pp. 30-31. 
38] See Article 38 (2), ibid., at p. 12. See also Articles 
39-44, pp. 12-14 .. 
39] See Article 14 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958, referred to in Note 32 supra. 
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19R2, t:he concept of ''innocent passage'' which is further amplified 
is applicable in the context of the territorial sea, Part II, 
Section 3, as well as Part III, Section 3, Strait used for inter-
national navigation, excluded from the application of the r~gime 
of transit passage under Article 38 (1), or between a part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial 
sea of a foreign State. 40] This "innocent passage'' is also 
applicable through archipelagic waters under Article 52 of the 
1982 Convention. 41] 
4. "Archipelagic sea lanes passage" means, under Article 
53 (3) of the 1982 Convention, 42] "The exercise in accordance 
with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight 
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expedit-
ions and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone. ,, Paragraphs 4 and 5 prescribe 
further requirements for the archipelagic sea lanes passage which 
~shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial 
sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as routes 
for international navigation or overflight through or over 
archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships 
are concerned, all normal navigational channels, provided that 
duplication of routes of similar convenience between the same 
entry and exit points shall not be necessary." 43] Such sea 
lanes and air routes shall be defined as a series of conti-
nuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the 
exit points. Ships and aircrafts in archipelagic sea lanes passage 
32/ ... 
40] See Article 19 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea, 
1982, cited in Note 33, at pp. 6-7. 
41 J See Article 53, ibid . . p. 17. 
42] Ibid., p. 17. 
43] Ibid., Article 53 (4) at p. 17. 
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shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side 
of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships 
and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 
per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands 
bordering the sea lane. 44] Traffic separation schemes may 
also be prescribed for the safe passage of ships through narrow 
channels in such sea lanes. 45] 
b. Variety of rights of passage 
Following the preceding description of the different 
types of passage, it may be convenient to examine the variety 
of rights relating to the different types of passage outlined. 
1. The "right of passage", for example, must be viewed 
as the most extensive right incidental to freedom of navigation. 
It is not confined to any sea lanes or routes or subjected to 
any traffic separation schemes, being one of the freedoms of 
the high seas. In the narrower context of the territorial sea, 
however, the passage has of nccessi ty to be ''innocent". 
2. The "right of transit passage" through straits is the 
creation of a new r§gime in modern ocean law, applicable to 
''straits used for international navigation". It restricts the 
freedom of navigation or overflight to the sole purpose of conti-
nuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part 
33/ ... 
44] Ibid., Article 53 (5) at p. 17. 
45] Ibid., Article 53 (6) at p. 17; compare Article 41 (Sea 
Janes and traffic separation schemes in straits used for 
international navigation), paras 1-7. 
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of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part 
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 
3. The ''right of transit Eassage" through archipelagic 
waters is somewhat larger and more flexible than through a strait 
used for international navigation. There is room for deviation 
within the 25 miles range of the archipelagic sea lanes and air 
routes and the sole purpose of continuous, expeditious and un-
obstructed transit is further tightened by the requirement of 
non-obstruction by the archipelagic State. 
4. The ''right of innocent passage" is better knovm and 
more traditional in the sense that it has to some extent been 
established in the practice of States, as confirmed in no uncertain 
terms, in the Corfu Channel Case (1949) 46]. Controversy persists 
nonetheless as regards the requirements of ''innocence'' or "innocent 
character'' of the passage. This has been further clarified by 
Article 19 of the LOS Convention of 1982 47] by way of general 
description of an innocent passage plus an enumeration of cir-
cumstances precluding the innocence of the passage. The right 
of passage through such waters as the territorial waters of a 
coastal State or an international strait excluded from the applica-
tion of the regime of transit passage under Article 38 (1). or 
between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone 
and the territorial sea of a foreign State, is therefore restricted 
by the requirement of the passage being "innocent" within the 
46] 
47] 
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See U.K. v. Albania, Corfu Channel Case (Merits) l.C.J. 
Repo~1949, pp. 4 et seq., the right of passage is recogniz-
ed for peace time "provided' the passage is innocent". 
See Article 19 of the LOS Convention 1982, U.N. Publication 
1983, at pp. 6-7. 
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meaning of Article 19. 48] Without at this stage conjecturing 
the extent or limits of this right of innocent passage, it is 
necessary to underline the compromise nature of the formula adopted, 
which, not unlike other compromises, is susceptible of differing 
interpretation to be acceptable to all States, or at least to 
generate general acquiescence if not consensus. 
35/ ... 
48] Under Article 19 (1), "passage is innocent as long as 
it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security 
of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in 
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of 
international law." "Passage of a foreign ship shall 
be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State it in the territorial 
sea it engages in any of the following activities : 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of 
the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation 
of the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations; 
(qJ _any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice 
of the defence or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aim~d at affecting the defence 
or security of the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency 
or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration 
or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal States; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to 
this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(to be continued . .. ) 
2. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IDENTIFIED 
Several questions of fundamental importane have been raised 
in connexion with the right of transit passage through straits 
used for international navigation. The first question that stands 
out is the division of international straits that permit of transit 
passage and those that would allow only innocent passage in the 
same way as a passage through the territorial water of another 
State. 
The second basic question of legal and stategic significance 
is the differences between the right of transit passage and its 
applicability on the one hand and the very restricted right of 
innocent passage on the other. 
The third question relates to the rights of men-of-war 
or war~ships in time of peace to pass through international straits. 
Can a man-of-war exercise the right of transit passage through 
international straits open for ordinary vessels of commerce with 
their right of transit passage? Ultimately, can a warship ever 
exercise the right of innocent passage in peace time without 
being in one way or another prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State? Only activities having a 
direct bearing on passage, such as uninterrupted and undelayed 
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(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of 
communication or any other facilities or installations 
of the coastal State; 
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage." (para 2). 
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navigation or continuous and expeditious voyage would not be 
considered to be "not innocent". Fishing, collecting scientific 
data, exploring, mine-sweeping, naval exercise, radio trans-
mission jamming, testing, training, loading or unloading, 
launching any aircraft or object would render the passage of 
a ship "not innocent" in spite of the peaceful character of 
the vessel, be it private ;merchantman or government ship 
other than a man-of-war. 
The positons of States regarding these questions are neces-
sarily varied. The Super Powers and other traditionally maritime 
powers would insist on freedom of transit passage through an 
international strait, however defined in order to ensure their 
"presence'' throughout the world in time of crisis. Coastal 
States with less effective means of self-defence would prefer 
to have their security safeguarded by absence of the show of 
forces, sea and air power, of the stronger States. Their interests 
appear to conflict inter se. There appears to exist also a 
third group of States which may need the assistance of their 
allies in time of emergency, hence the need to support freedom 
of transit" p~~sage. On the other hand, this freedom should be 
sufficiently restricted to permit the coastal States or strait 
States adequate control of movement of hostile vessels through 
their territorial waters or the straits they border. A compromise 
has had to be struck and it has to be sufficiently controversial 
to allow for differences in interpretation and implementation. 
Resulting conflicts could be resolved through the various pacific 
means of dispute settlement to be worked out in State practice. 
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3. THAILAND'S POSITION ON TRANSIT PASSAGE 
To assess Thailand's position on the right of transit passage 
is an interesting challenge. Different aspects of the question 
need to be examined with the greatest care. 
(a) General Principles 
Thailand's policies are conditioned by certain considerations 
and constraints. There are some principles from which Thailand 
cannot deviate. She must continue to support freedom of navigation, 
having regard to her liberal trade policies and the right to fish 
in as wide an ocean space as could be allocated. Thailand's 
strong opposition to "mare clausum" jn the context of fisheries 
is too well known to need any elaboration at this point. 
Freedom of navigation and other freedom of the high seas 
have not embittered Thailand's experience with western expansionism 
to the point of losing her national independence and territorial 
integrity. The gunboat diplomacy of the West was intolerable 
but it was endured with untold hardship. But past is past. 
The present posture of Thailand continues to be supportive of 
freedom of navigation, hence relatively free transit passage 
through international straits for her own fishing vessels, 
merchant marine and also naval forces. 
In the world of inter-dependence, mutual assistance is 
indispensable. Thailand stands in need of help from her friends 
and allies. Freedom of transit passage may provide a key to 
her defence and survival in terms of logistic support and other 
forms of subsistence assistance. 
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(b) Geographical or geopolitical considerations 
"Transit passage'' is a plus for Thailand from the point 
of view of her geographical situation and geopolitical position. 
Thailand's peninsular portion in the South serves to separate 
her defence fleets into two, one for the Gulf of Thailand and 
another, perhaps less important, for the Anderman Sea, and Indian 
Ocean. Divided in fact by the Malacca straits, Thai fleets 
of all types, whether fishing, commercial or governmental vessels, 
cannot readily service both sides of the Southern panhandle border-
ed by the Gulf of Thailand to the East and the Anderman Sea to 
the West. 
Besides, given the definition of ''passage" through territorial 
water , there is little chance of a hostile vessel exercising 
any right of transit or indeed innocent passage through Thailand's 
territorial water . It is essentially, therefore, in Thailand's 
national self-interest to protect the right of transit passage 
as well as innocent passage for all practical purposes for all 
Thai flags. Thailand stands to gain more than lose on the general 
application of the right of "transit passage". 
(c) Thailand's positions 
In the ultimate analysis, national self-interests, immediate, 
intermediate or long-term, cannot per se conclusively determine 
Thailand policies. Taking into account the principal role initially 
played by Thailand in ASEAN, Thailand cannot afford to turn 
deaf ears to the pleadings of her close associates and friendliest 
neighbours. The position of ASEAN cannot be said to be uniform 
in this particular connexion. While the Philippines and Indonesia 
would prefer to" restrict "transit passage" as much as possible, 
thus, allowing the coastal States, or archipelagic States or 
indeed strait States, to exercise effective control over the 
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passage of foreign vessels of all denominations, especially warships 
which should seek prior authorization before commencing any transit 
passage. Malaysia is also inclined in this direction although 
she has been less vocal. On the other hand, Singapore, albeit 
a riparian of the Malacca Strait, and hence further bound by 
a stronger sense of solidarity to support the majority in the 
Malacca Strait, is clearly concerned with its own freedom of 
navigation and transit passage not only for its own flags but 
more precisely also for international commerce and navigation, 
being dependent, although to a diminishing degree, on the entrep6t 
trade. Traffic separation schemes approved by the I.M.O. 
(Intergovernmental Maritime Organization) appear to provide the 
much needed balance to ensure Singapore's positive stand in favour 
of transit passage guaranteed by safety of navigation. Thailand's 
position within ASEAN is unique in that unlike the Philippines 
which is an archipelagic State and further away from Malacca 
Strait, Thailand is virtually the opposite of an archipelagic 
State. Her southern isthmus separates two seas, and therefore 
two fleets. Furthermore, she is immediately opposite to India 
and Indonesia and adjacent to Malaysia. 
In the circumstances, Thailand is obliged to keep a low 
profile, fully cognizant of her national interests in regard 
to the right of transit passage while not unmindful of the vital 
interests of her ASEAN friends and associates. She also has 
to take into consideration her own security interests which may 
be linked to other overseas friendly powers beyond ASEAN and 
Southeast Asia. Thailand must go along with whatever compromise 
has been reached, after trying her hardest to have her interests 
adequately reflected and protected, by making certain that her 
fleets are not permanently separated and friendly assistanace 
from overseas is not precluded by non-application of transit 
passage for military or other assistance in time of need. 
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IV. DISPUTES SETTLEMENT 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
(a) General Policies and Guidelines 
"AROKA PARAMA LABHA". However potent may be the cure 
prevention of illness is best. The Thais, like many other Buddhists 
in Asia, remain firm believers in this philosophy. Orientals 
share a natural aversion for litiqation in general and inter-
national adjudication in particular. 49] 
Despite the numerous variations of pacific methods of 
dispute settlement or conflict resolution~ including the principal 
means mentioned in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
none seems in Thailand's bitter experience to have offered an 
ideal solution to the problem of conflict resolution. 
Thailand is convinced that it is far better to prevent 
conflict, to avoid the causes of conflict and to pre-empt any 
potential dispute from arising, than to allow an internatinal 
difference to grow into a conflict or dispute between nations 
requiring delicate and ceaseless attention. 
As Thailand can afford neither the time nor the expenses 
for international adjudication or other l~sser forms of third-
party dispute settlement, the first priority for Thailand is 
to avoid friction or potential dispute at all costs. 
49] Compare the Chinese saying 
Fire does not consume land. 
robbery and fire combined.n 
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(b) Anticipation and identification of problem areas 
Thailand's best insurance against risks of conflict in 
the context of the new law of the sea lies in her ability to 
anticipate problem areas where conflicts are likeliest. It is 
abundantly clear that the new ocean law is opening new possi-
bilities for the exploration and exploitation of all living and 
non-living resources of the sea, the sea-bed, ocean floor and 
mineral resources underneath. 
Apart from fisheries conservation and management which, 
as noted in Section II 50] 1 may require attention in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, the exploration and exploitation of living 
and non-living resources of the ocean depends on the national 
confines of a State. The problem of delimitation of maritime 
boundaries is inevitable, vis-a-vis, opposite and adjacent States, 
both with regard to water-column and the continental shelves 
and subsoil. New areas require new delimitation, partially uni-
laterally to some extent such as the drawing of straight baselines, 
partially with the common heritage of mankind, separating the 
E.E.Z.s from the high seas or areas beyond 200 miles, and the 
continental shelves within the 200 miles as well as the extension 
of the continental margin for up to 350 miles measured from the 
base-lines. 
Such unilateral measures are not necessarily binding 
unless acquiesced in by other interested States. Absence of 
protest or objection may indicate some certainty in such actions. 
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Other types of delimitation involving the marking of a 
frontier line dividing adjacent States or opposite States obviously 
requires the agreement or concurrence of the other party or indeed 
parties, in regard, for instance, to a tri-junction. 
(c) Thailand's preventive or pre-emptive measures 
It is Thailand's conviction that pre-emption is better 
than remedial or curative effort. Thus, long before the signing 
of the LOS Convention on December 10, 1982, Thailand had embarked 
on the negotiations of a series of bilateral treaties to delimit 
her maritime boundaries with her most immediately adjacent neigh-
bours, including Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and India. Kampuchea 
did reach a draft agreement before it was overtaken by an upheaval 
which put the clock back for that unfortunate country. Vietnam 
also endeavoured to reach agreement with some of its neighbours, 
but so far yielding little results, owing to its somewhat unusual 
theory of the deepest channel or thalweg, an analogy derived 
from the law of international rivers. 
Anxious to settle the delimitation question with all her 
neighbours, Thailand must be seen as very willing and generous 
in making concessions to India, Burma and Indonesia without much 
bargaining. Thailand must have appeared to be the most agreeable 
and easiest to negotiate partners. What is imporwntr is the 
certainty of the delimitation agreed upon by the parties. Whatever 
the principle preferred or adopted, equitable principles or 
other geographical or geometrical techniques such as equidistance 
or median line, as long as the results are equitable and agreeable, 
Thailand will accept and honour. Thus the agreement with India 
was concluded in record time. The Thai-Burmese maritime boundary 
was based on quasi or approximate equidlstance~ principle. The 
Thai side approved Burmese line more than once without quibbling. 
The tri-junction, Thai-India-Indonesia, was the first to be 
established in the sub-region. 
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The problem with Malaysia was more difficult. It concerned 
an area in the Gulf of Thailand. because of the existence of 
many special circumstances, including the presence of an island 
and shifting sand at th~ mouth of the Golok boundary river. 
The good will of both Parties, backed by genuine conviction in 
the principle of good neighbourliness. led the leaders of the 
two Southeast Asian ASEAN Kingdoms to overcome what had appeared 
to be insuperable difficulties and conclude an agreement which 
was durable enough to ensure timely exploration and exploitation 
of all mineral resources in the area in question, designated 
under the agreement as the "Joint Development Area". Problems 
of great legal, political and economic significance have been 
resolved, and there are many more to be overcome in the actual 
implementation and administration. The creation of a joint Malaysia-
Thailand authority is the establishment of an international 
organization to administer the joint development area, applying 
a regime and a development law which is neither Thai nor Malaysian. 
Once the two Parties could reach agreement, private sectors 
interested in the joint-development area also have to renegotiate 
since the original concession agreements were without exception 
applicable to areas already delimited. In the absence of delimi-
tation, a new regime will have to be introduced and accepted 
by all concerned. It may take further negotiations, but one 
thing is clear, Thailand and Malaysia could agree on the joint 
exploration and exploitation of resources in the area. 
(d) Obstacles to overcome 
Negotiation is an art that requires both knowledge and 
skills, knowledge of what constitute the national interests 
at stake and their priority, and the skill to persuade the co-
partner to accept the wisdom of a mutually beneficial agreement . 
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Far-sightedness and insight are difficult to learn. The ability 
to estimate the level of the bottom line and to calculate the 
econometrics or each step of the bargain, including the advantages 
and disadvantages to be carefully weighe~ is only acquired after 
long experience. 
Understanding and appreciation of each other's position 
and difficulties must be learned by negotiators. Thailand has 
been successful in several negotiations and also unsuccessful 
in several .others which required subsequent efforts and for-
bearance to rectify the situation. The Special Yen Agreement 
may be given as one such example of protracted renegotiation. 
Clearly Thailand is more or less experienced compared to some 
of her Asian colleagues. The art of negotiation can be learned 
and passed on from school to school, from generation to generation. 
A thorough understanding of the subject~matter is essential to 
successful negotiations. Of late, multilateral negotiations 
have become a permanent feature in international relations and 
meetings. Legal knowledge and linguistic abilities will go 
a long way towards the making of a sound negotiator. There 
is no substitute for intelligence, far-sightedness and sincerity. 
The Japanese experience has been systematic, progressive and 
fully disciplined. 
2. AVAILABLE OPTIONS 
Among the alternative methods of dispute settlement 
should be mentioned negotiation, good offices, commission of 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settle-
ment. It might be pertinent to examine some of these pacific 
means of conflict resolution in the light of Thailand's recent 
experience, excluding the imposition of unequal treaties and 
the untiring efforts of Thailand to negotiate their elimination.50] 
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(a) Negotiation and renegotiatio~ 
As is shown in the preceding subsection, negotiation 
is a means to reach agreement between States and also to avoid 
or pre-empt future conflicts. Thus, a well thought out agreement 
is not likely to generate disputes. Should a dispute arise, 
however, from a negotiated arrangement, then the most natural 
and immediate way to deal with the situation is direct negotiation 
or renegotiation between the original parties involved. 
Even where a dispute arises out of a situation and not 
from an agreement, negotiation affords the first and foremost 
logical means to air the difference with the view to resolving 
whatever conflict that may persist. Negotiation, or renegotiation 
as the case may be. is therefore the very first attempt at conflict 
resolution or dispute settlement. 
It is sometimes said that not everything is negotiable. 
Thus, neither peace, nor sovereignty nor political independence 
of a State would seem negotiable. 51] It should also be added 
that many other things are negotiable, and disputes can be success-
fully negotiatd to the mutual satisfaction of both or all parties 
involved. 
"Renegotiation" has been employed as a means to reschedule 
international debts in the case of a state of necessity. Thailand 
has had to renegotiate out of a status of unequal treaties like 
other Asian nations under a r~gime of extra-territoriality 
such as China, Japan and Turkey. 
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be . non-negotiable issues. 
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In the context of ocean law, Thailand has had to negotiate 
with everyone of her neighbours to delimit her maritime boundary, 
primarily the continental shelf and eventually also the E.E.Z. 
Further negotiations, such as with Vietnam, remain to be under-
taken in due course and with utmost care and vigilance. 
Fishery agreements both at governmental level and joint 
venture agreements have had to be negotiated and continue to be 
an item for further negotiation or renegotiation in several 
areas of interests to fishing nations and coastal States. 
The consideratins that apply to negotiation to avoid and 
pre-empt conflict equally apply to negotiations to resolve existing 
dispute or conflict that has resulted. Thailand has had her 
share of satisfaction and disappointment, of success and failure, 
both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
(b) Good offices 
Once negotiation or renegotiation fails to produce agreed 
results, other means at the disposal of the Parties must be 
examined and employed if at all practicable. "Good offices" 
appear to be the most palatable or the least objectionable 
among the means of third-party dispute settlement. Next to 
negotiation, "good offices'' afford a conveni~nt means to resolve 
a conflict with the assistance or rather with a "passive" attend-
ance by a third party, providing the good offices, without assert-
ing any views on the substance of the dispute. 
In her recent practice, Thailand has found this method 
to be the least burdensome if not indeed the most acceptable 
of all the methods of third-party conflict resolution. The party 
providing the ''good offices'' remains a silent observer in the 
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process of negotiation between the parties in dispute. "Good 
offices'' include every possible facility to induce the parties 
to a negotiating table. Such facilities include not only 
accommodation, meeting room, translation services and precis-
writers, but also other amenities to allow free and frank exchang-
es of views between the parties. It does not preclude an independent 
opinion, now and then, of a procedural nature or explanation 
of implications under the established practice of the United 
Nations, for instance, in the case of the "good offices" provided 
by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in disputes between Thailand 
and Kampuchea in 1960 which culminated in the conclusion of 
four sets of exchange of letters between the Parties in the presence 
of the Secretary-General and his deputy, Ambassador Engers of 
Norway. 
"Good offices" of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations have been employed by Thailand and Kampuchea in subsequent 
dispute or situation which requires the presence of an independent 
observer representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
such as Ambassador Bo de Ribbing of Sweden. 
Thailand, in turn, has provided the much needed good 
offices which contributed to the successful resolution of the 
"CONFRONTATIE" between Indonesia and Malaysia in the mid sixties, 
and between the Philippines and Malaysia immediately after the 
creation of Malaysia including Sabbah in 1963. In this tri-
angular conflict, Thailand presented herself as a disinterested 
Party, with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, commandin~ the respect 
and confidence of the three Parties in question. Minister Khoman's 
good offices restored law and order in Southeast Asia and paved 
the way for the next phase of regional cooperation, the establish-
ment of ASEAN. 
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For Thailand, "good offices" are welcome and much encouraged, 
especially for resolution of regional or sub-r·egional conflicts. 
(c) Commission of enquiry 
Under this heading may be included among the pacific means 
of conflict resolution the establishment of a "commission of 
enquiry" or a "fact-finding commission" or ''committee" or simply 
"verification team'' to ascertain, . establish or verify the existence 
of certain facts or situation. Thus, a "fact-finding commission" 
was established to find facts regarding the practice of genocide 
in Kampuchea after the fall of Longnol and the establishment 
of Democratic Kampuchea under Polpot in 1975. "Commission of 
enquiry" or "fact-finding commission" whose task it is to ascertain 
and report on actual situation has often been used by an inter-
national organization such as the United Nations. On a smaller 
scale, a "verification team" may be set up to verify or confirm, 
say the withdrawal of a number of guerillas despatched across 
the border. Thus, Thailand was asked to send a "verification 
team" to verify and certify the withdrawal of Indonesian troops 
from various points in Sarawak, Malaysia, during the height 
of .the "Confrontatie" between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1964-
1965. 
(d) Mediation 
''Mediation" has not always been a happy medium to reach 
a satisfactory solution to any international conflict.In one 
instance, Count Bernadette, a mediator for the Palestinian coflict 
lost his life to an assasin. Secretary-General Dag Hammaskjold 
himself met with a tragic accident in Africa on a mission of 
a fact-finding nature. As far as Thailand is concerned, mediation 
is a method to avoid. Japan mediated the dispute between Thailand 
and France, resulting in the Tokyo Convention of May 9, 1941 
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before the outbreak of the Pacific war. Thailand signed an agree-
ment with the Vichy Government only partially restoring portions 
of territories earlier ceded to France by Thailand under the 
1904 and 1907 Treaties, while Japan, acting as mediator, took 
over the rest of French Indochina. Mediation reminds us of the 
story of TA IN and TA NA, fighting over the fish, disagreeing 
as to which half should belong to whom, while TA YU, the mediator, 
took the body, giving the head of the fish to one party and the 
tail to another. 
(e) Conciliation 
Conciliation is another method of pacific settlement of 
dispute through conciliation procedure, generally each Party 
nominating one member to serve on the three or five member 
commission nominated from a panel of international jurists of 
recognized competence, such as members of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration at The Hague. 
Thailand has had one experience in a territorial dispute 
with France following the Settlement Accord of Washington of 
November 17, 1946, 52) establishing a five-member Conciliation 
Commission under Article XXI of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 
December 7, 1937. This was all in accordance with the General 
Act of Geneva of September 26, 1926 53] for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes. 
Thailand nominated one expert to the Commission chaired 
by Ambassador Belaunde of Peru. The Conciliation Commission \-Jas 
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See Article III of the Washington Accord 1946, 344 UNTS 
59, No. 4943, and exchange of letters. 
See LNTS Vol. 93, p. 343, and Vol. 197, p. 304. 
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heavily lopsided to begin with in favour of France, as a Latin 
and Roman Catholic culture. Counsel for Thailand induced almost 
every imaginable argument for the return of lost territories, 
including ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinities. The Commission 
recommended in favour of France, basing its reasoning on political 
and legal considerations, especially applying under the law of 
treaties, inter alia, the principle "Pacta sunt servanda". 
Thailand was disappointed. Once bitten, she became shy and more 
careful of western procedures of pacific settlement of dispute. 
Of late, however, conciliation commission of a kind has 
been reintroducted for compulsory settlement of legal and political 
disputes with binding effect within the framework of ASEAN. Each 
member is to designate a minister to serve on the conciliation 
commission. 54] There is thus far no recorded hearing or 
recommendation on any dispute or question. 
Conciliation commission has also been adopted in the latest 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
and betweeninternational Organizations, 1986, 55] as a compulsory 
procedure for settlement of disputes concerning the application 
of "jus cogens". In a way the procedure for compulsory arbitration 
is combined with compulsory conciliation, and arbitrators/con-
ciliators are persons of recognized competence in international 
law. 
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54] See, e.g., C. Quisumbing, "Problem and Prospects of ASEAN 
Law : Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Dispute 
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1981, p. 300. 
55] See the relevant articles 53 and 64 on Jus Cogens of the 
1986 Convention, not yet entered into force. 
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(f) Arbitration 
Many types of international arbitration are possible, 
as between States, some with compulsory procedure and binding 
awards, others within the framework of an established arbitral 
tribunal, or the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, 
or ad hoc tribunal. or sole arbitrator. 
Commercial arbitration in the context of internaional 
trade lies outside the scope of the present introduction, but 
international arbitration involving government contracts or con-
cessions, or the type of ICSID convention arbitration, between 
States and private enterprises in connection with development 
investments may be of some interest. Thailand has recently signed 
the ICSID Convention which awaits ratification before entry into 
force for Thailand. Her internal law and procedures allowing 
international arbitration will have to be amended or readjusted. 
Recently, Thailand was party to a dispute which was brought 
before an arbitral tribunal in Zurich by Union Oil Co. (1986) 56] 
concerning royalties assessment. 
(g) Judicial Settlement 
Thailand was among the very few Asian nations that attended 
the First and Second Peace Conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 
1907, and subscribed to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, whose 
panel of arbitrators nominate candidates for judges in the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and since 1945 the Inter-
national Court of Justice at The Hague. Thailand was an original 
member of the Statute of the Permanent Court but did not become 
party to the Statute of the International Court until 1946, a 
year since its existence and operation. 
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Thailand ranks among important nations which have suffered 
some disappointments at the hands of the highest judicial instance 
for pacific settlement of international disputes. The United 
Kingdom was not particularly pleased with the decisions of the 
Court in the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1951-
52 57] and the Anglo-Norv-Jegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norwuy) 
1951. 58] Nor was the United States especially enthusiastic 
about a recent decision in Nicaragua v. U.S.A., 1986/ 59] The 
U.S. Government appears to have expressed the sentiment of dis-
enchantment felt by Thailand after the judgement in the Temple 
of Phra Viharn Case, 1961-62. 60] The darkest days of the 
Court came upon its judgement in the South-West Africa Cases (second 
~!;-
phase), 1966,61] _ andAhas encountered endless difficulties, 
trying to recover from that case. Both Thailand and the United 
States declared their sense of disillusionment by the decisions 
of the Court which were believed to be due in no small measure 
to the hazard of its composition at the material times, i.e., 
57] 
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U.K. v. Iran, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 1951-1952, 
~J. Reports 1951, p. 89. 
(Interim Measures); I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 93 at p. 103, 
(Pleliminary Objections). 
58] U.K. v. Norway, 1951, I.C.J. Reports, p. 116. 
59] Nicaragua v. U.S.A., 1986, June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986. 
60] Cambodia v. Thailand, 1961-1962, I.C.J. Keports 1961, 
p.17 (Preliminary Objections), ibid., 1962. 
61] I.C.J. Reports 1960, p.6. 
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in 1962. and in 1986 by the United States for diametrically 
opposite reasons. Thailand thought the Court was too European 
and colonial in its approach to the law of treaties, especially 
where treaties were induced by force while the United States 
hinted that the Court was leaning excessively towards non-European 
views of the Third World. The truth of the matter is that very 
few States have been satisfied with the performance of the Court. 
More recent cases have been frequently maritime delimitation 
disputes, directly arising out of the new Law of the Sea. It 
should be noted that developed countries preferred arbitration 
(e.g., U.K. v. France delimitation) or special chamber to select 
their own judges (e.g., Canada v. U.S.A.). while countries from 
the Third world, especially Africa and Latin America have sought 
judicial settlement of their maritime boundary disputes by the 
International Court of Justice. 
The experience of Thailand has been one of bitter dis-
appointment. From the start, a mistake was made by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations in his note reminding Thailand 
that her declaration made in 1939 to the Permanent Court which 
the Secretary-General erroreously believed was transferred to 
the International Court of Justice in 1945 was about to expire 
in 1949 and suggested that Thailand should renew that declaration, 
which in fact as well as in law lapsed in 1945. 62] Unquestion-
ingly, Thailand without consulting the Cabinet, let alone seeking 
parliamentary approval, filed a declaration renewing the old 
declaration that had long lapsed, believing falsely with the 
Secretary-General that it was still valid and unthinkingly that 
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1957, I.C.J. Reports 1957, Pleadings. 
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it was the normal thing to do. The facts of international life 
were far from Thailand's innocent and credulous belief. 63] 
On the merits of the Temple Case. the Court erred in favour 
of a colonial power by allowing acquisition of title against 
the original holder, not by usucapion nor by subsequent conduct, 
and contrary to boundary treaty provisions, but, basing its decision 
on the binding character of an erroneous French-made map which 
was the source of publications and reproductions on papers without 
actual possession on the ground. 64] The Court wrongly held Thailand's 
silence to be acquiescence, while, in actual fact, Thailand had 
always been in actual possession of the Temple without any protest 
from France. Does it mean then that territorial sovereignty 
could be displaced by mere surreptitious publication of a false 
map or misleading or inaccurate docu.ment? 
Since 1962, Thailand's disenchantment with judicial settle-
ment of disputes prevented her from filing any further declaration 
under the optional clause. This does not mean that Thailand 
is necessarily averse to the Court or its compulsory jurisdiction. 
In fact, the decision in the Temple Case was carried out under 
strong reservation. Serious objections were expressed through the 
Thai Representative in the Sixth Committee in 1962. Thailand's 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has since 
been on a selective. ad hoc or eclectic basis, such as, in 
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63] A young Director-General of the Department of United Nations 
Affairs in Bangkok, bypassing the Legal Adviser's Office. 
gave the view in 1949 that Thailand should of necessity 
accept the optional clause like every body else. (sic.) 
64] The Temple Case (Merits) , I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.6. The 
map was not an integral part of the Treaty of 1904. It 
was made much later not strictly in conformity with the 
relevant Treaty provisions. 
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bilateral treaties on conditions of strict reciprocity and subject 
to appropriate reservation or in multilateral conventions on 
a special subject where compulsory jurisdiction is deemed to 
be useful, practical and without discrimination or element of 
surprise. In principle, Thailand does not object to compulsory 
adjudication. so long as she could choose her partners or opponents 
or the subject-matters of the dispute to be submitted for adjudication. 
What is lacking in Thailand is perhaps not so much the 
necessary brain-power 65] as an adequate appreciation by the 
Government of the role of international law and the necessity 
to place the conduct of foreign relations and possibility of 
dispute settlement on a sound basis of the law rather than on 
superstitions or groundless suspicion or witchcraft. The Government 
must begin a process of self-education to accept the sound legal 
advice of its own native experts and not readily and summarily 
to dismiss as hostile any constructive suggestion based on sound 
legal reasoning. 66] Legal expertise should be cultivated not 
discouraged if a nation such as Thailand expects to survive in 
this severely competitive world. 67] 
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65] In fact, very few Thais have reached international recognition. 
Only two in the span of a century were elected to the Institute 
of International Law, the first one was originally a Belgian 
national, Gustav Rolin Jacquemyne, Chao Phya Abhai Raja. 
Only one Thai was invited to teach at the Hague 
Academy of International Law at the regular session. Only 
two Thai jurists were ever elected to serve on the Inter-
national Law Commission of the United Nations. One was 
nevertheless the first Asian ever to be appointed Special 
Rapporteur of the CommLSSion. 
66] In 1960, a young Thai jurist was nearly summarily executed 
under Section 17 of the order of the Revolutionary Council 
for contradicting an optimistic assessment that Thailand 
had a 300 per cent chance of winning the Temple Case. Had 
it not been for the shrewdness of Field Marshall Sarit 
Dhanarajata the Thai expert would have long perished 
before his attaining international recognition. 
67] Thailand never had a Judge on an International Court inspite 
of the existence of a number of her most highly qualified 
publicists. Indeed, no other nation in the world instructed 
its representative to dissuade its allies from voti119 for 
its national candidate. even if it was just an election 
fn fill in a casual vacancy. 
SUCHhR.l TKUL/ :)b 
3. NEW DISPUTES SETTLEMENT MACHINERIES AND THAILAND'S REACTIONS 
(a) New options open by the Convention of 1982 
Under the LOS Convention 1982, new procedures and new 
mechanisms are being set up to facilitate still further the solution 
to the problem of dispute settlement in the context of the new 
Ocean Law. There appears to be a proliferation of judicial 
machineries with adjudicative functions to determine questions 
of law and of fact relating to matters falling within the scope 
of the new ocean law. Parties to a dispute have much wider 
options than ever before. There is truly an ''embarras de choix" 
of different procedures for compulsory dispute settlement including 
compulsory arbitration, compulsory conciliation and compul-
sory adjudicative jurisdiction by one of the special tribunals 
or chambers in addition to, and intentionally or otherwise, in 
competition with existing machineries including the Permanent 
Court of~rbitration and the International Court of Justice with 
its new streamlined procedures for special chamber. There are 
also options for non-compulsory procedures available, such as 
conciliation and fact-finding commission. The compulsory pro-
cedures may also entail binding decisions. 
Thus, in addition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
at The Hague, and the International Court of Justice which continue 
to be available to settle all legal disputes between the Parties, 
the following new procedures and machineries are envisaged upon 
entry into force of the LOS Convention of 1982. 
(1) The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
The proposal to establish an international tribunal for 
the law of the sea has been well received without much opposition 
although with some reservation. The duplication and proliferation 
of judicial institutions with overlapping functions are intended 
to provide further options and to allow the law progressively 
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to be developed within the framework of its particular specialisations. 
The new tribunal is characterized by its administrative rather 
than purely legal approach. Besides the Parties to a conflict 
may include subjects of international law other than States, 
such as international organizations, public and juridical persons 
could have their disputes settled by the international tribunal 
for the law of the sea. 
(2) The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber 
This special chamber is provided by Article 187 (Part 
XI) of the Convention with jurisdiction to entertain and decide 
disputes in regard to activities in the area under the adminis-
tration of the Sea-Bed Authority covering six categories of 
disputes between State Parties or between a State Party and the 
Authority or between Parties to a contract, or between a prospective 
contractor and the Authority, or between States Parties, or, 
the Authority or the Enterprise and natural or juridical persons. 
Procedures for requesting advisory opinions are also open. Other 
(. 
procedures such as an ad hoc Chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes 
Chamber and binding commercial arbitration are also available 
under Article 188. 
(3) The Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII of the Convention 
Annex VII of the Convention provides for the establishment 
of the Arbitral Tribunal designed to overcome some of the difficulties 
encountered by existing international arbitral tribunals. It 
is intended to furnish an improved model to facilitate arbitration. 
Not unlike the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the 
LOS Arbitral Tribunal is composed of a panel of arbitrators, 
four from each member States, presumably the arbitrators are 
qualified persons with experience in maritime affairs and enjoy 
the highest reputation of fairness, competence and professional 
integrity. The arbitral awards are final and binding on the Parties. 
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Full compliance with the award by the Parties is assumed. 
(4) The Special Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VIII 
A special arbitral tribunal may be established in accordance 
with Annex VIII for one or more categories of the disputes specified 
in that Annex for highly technical disputes envisaged in Article 
287 (l)(d) of the Convention. Such special arbitral tribunal 
can be constituted for the interpretation and application of 
the articles 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
of the convention relating to : 
fisheries; 
protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
marine scientific research; and 
navigation, including pollution from vessels 
and by dumping. 
Special tribunals require experts, hence, a separate list 
of experts on various subjects will be compiled and maintained 
by the respective agencies such as the FAO, UNEP, Inter-
governmental Oceanic Commission, IMO and their subsidiary bodies. 
(b) Thailand's Positions 
Thailand's reactions to the new paraphenalia and potentials 
or possibilities for pacific settlement of ocean law disputes 
are less than enthusiastic, bearing in mind her general predi-
lection and priority for prevention or pre-emption of disputes 
from ever arising and her preference for negotiation and good 
offices. On the other hand, as a peace-loving nation, Thailand 
is opposed to the use of force as an instrument of national 
policy or a means to resolve conflicts. It should be added that 
the new compulsory procedures to be made available, including 
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the arbitral tribunal and special arbitral tribunal as well as 
the new international tribunal for the law of the sea will provide 
new options that may be acceptable· in the ultimate analysis as 
the very last resort, having exhausted all other preferred methods 
of conflict resolution. 
The additional.available procedures are welcome provided 
that no undue burderl is thereby created. The choice for Thai-
land as a prospective Party to a dispute in this context must 
remain equally wide if not indeed wider and more flexible in 
the light of the new ocean law and the proliferation of arbitral 
and adjudicative bodies, new and current, with overlapping functions 
to choose from. In this respect, the Convention is a package 
Hith a widening choice of procedures for compulsory settlement 
of disputes to be opted by the Parties in advance or on an ad 
hoc basis in the event a dispute has arisen. Although the 
package is not open to reservation, it is open to declaration 
regarding options. 
V. MARINE POLLUTION 
1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION 
OF l\1ARINE ENVIRONMENT 
The problem of marine pollution is relatively of recent 
occurrence. The expanse of ocean space used to seem unlimited 
and virtually untarnished by the amount of dumps and wastes intro-
duced by man. Of late, however, the situation appears to have 
changed and the danger to the world ecology has become a living 
reality, owing to the accumulation of industrial and nuclear 
waste, chemical discharges and radio-active materials and fallouts 
which have found their way into the ocean and the superjacent 
atmosphere. Even the ozone layer seems to have diminished in 
intensity, threatening the health of man and other living creatures. 
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(a) Nuclear Fallouts 
The testing of nuclear explosions in the Pacific by the 
United States in 1954 causing death to one Japanese fisherman 
and injury to several members of the Japanese fishing fleet in 
the area and the inhabitants of the Rongelap Atoll owing to con-
tamination beyond the radius of the calculated warning zones. 
The United States Government gave medical and other assistance 
and paid compensation ex gratia to the injured parties. 68] 
The United Kingdom also conducted nuclear tests on the high seas 
near Christmas Island in the Pacific from 1956-58. 69] These 
tests were not then considered to be illegal, although during 
the First Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 the 
Soviet proposed to make nuclear testing on the high seas a violat-
ion of the Convention was not voted upon at Geneva. 70] But 
the matter was instead referred to the General Assembly for 
"appropriate ation". 71] In 1963, a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
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68] See generally 4 Whiteman 553 et seq.; 
see also McDougal and Schiel, 64 Yale L.J. (1955), 648 
(for the legality of the tests) and Margolis, 64 Yale 
L. J. ( 1955), 629 (against their legality). 
69] See Hansard, H. C., Vo. 568, WrittenAnswers, cols. 27-
29, April 2, 1957. In U.K.'s view, it is impossible 
to consider the question of stopping nuclear tests without 
having regard to the wider problem of preventing war in 
general, including of course nuclear war. 
70] 4 Whiteman, 585-586, the U.S.S.R. conducted most of its 
tests in Siberia, but some also in the Barents Sea, p.574. 
71] Resolution on Nuclear Tests on the High Seas, 1958, Sea 
Conference Records, Vol. II, p. 24, p. 101 (text). 
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was signed and came into force, 72] with the strong implication 
that nuclear tests are outlawed and therefore illegal in inter-
national law. France did not sign the Test Ban Treaty and continu-
ed to conduct tests in the South Pacific in 1972 and 1973. Several 
States protested France's tests which led to the Nuclear Tests 
cases (1974) brought by Australia and New Zealand. 73] The 
Court did not pronounce upon the legality of nuclear tests 
over the ocean in the atmosphere. The cases were taken off the 
court's list without a decision being taken on the merits when 
France announced that she would not conduct further tests after 
1973. 74] It remains always questinable whether France's unilateral 
declaration was binding on France, and if so, who would be entitled 
to invoke this declaration. 75] 
72] 
73] 
74] 
75] 
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U.K.T.S. 3 (1964), Cmnd.2245; 480 U.N.T.S. 43. In force 
1963. 111 Contracting parties as of June 30, 1982, includ-
ing the U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. 
I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253 (Australia v. France), ibid., 
p. 451 (New Zealand v. France). For a discussion o-f---
the illegality of these tests, see Mercer, (1968), N.Z.& 
J. 405-408, 418-421, and Swan, 9 Melb. U.L.R. 296 
(1973-74). 
I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 253, 457, by a decision of 9 
to 6, the Court decided that the claim (by Australia/ 
New Zealand) no longer has any object and that therefore 
the Court is not called upon to give a decision thereon. 
France began testing again in 1981, and unashamedly admitt-
ed that one of the reasons that kept France in the South 
Pacific was the testing grounds for nuclear explosion. 
See also the Rainbow Warrior - Greenpeace Case, 1985. 
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(b) lnternatinal Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising 
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law 
Whatever the views of States on the legality of nuclear 
tests in the Pacific, whether or not the testing is an act prohibit-
ed by general international law, the State conducting the test 
must be held internationally liable for the injurious conse-
quences arising out of such act. This notion of international 
liabilityconstitutes a new item under study by the International 
Law Commission. The reports presented by the late Special Rapporteur, 
Professor Quentin-Baxter, and the current Special Rapporteur, 
Ambassador Julio Barbosa. have received general approval of 
the Sixth Committee and vJere VJarmly embraced by the developing cuntr ies 
(or the group of 77). International liability is established 
even in the absence of State responsibility and in spite of 
the circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 
The ugly truth of the matter is that developed countries 
like the United States and Japan had suffered considerably from 
industrial pollution within their respective borders, and that 
considerable efforts and expenses had to be deployed to combat 
pollution to protect and preserve healthy environment within 
the territorial confines of their own borders. The European 
States have concluded a Geneva Convention 1980 which has entered 
into force since 1985 to ensure abatement and regulation of 
the level of pollution from acid rains from the skies within 
Western and Central Europe. Yet, multi-national corporations 
established in accordance with the laws of Japan and other western 
countries set up factories in virgin lands, in the lands where 
nature was still beautiful, without exporting their sophisticated 
factories with all the safeguards required in accordance with 
their own internal laws had the factories been installed in their 
cuntries of origin. Without such safegurds, these corporations 
were able to make exhorbitant profits, by cutting costs and 
62/ ... 
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corners, not having to bear the necessary expenses and to take 
the required precautions against pollution, but only to reap 
unearned benefits at the expense of developing countries. This 
is particularly odious, when factories such as the Asahi Glass 
started in the early seventies to discharge mercury into the 
Chao Phya River and eventually into the Gulf of Thailand. Such 
injurious consequences could have easily been prevented, but 
were knowingly allowed to cause pollution of the river, the 
estuaries and the sea bordering the beaches in the inner Gulf 
of Thailand, injuring the physical health of bathers, and users 
of the river and sea waters, harming river and marine plants 
and fisheries of several significant species. Had such an incident 
occurred in a developed country such as in New York, the damages 
assessible by a United States court could have reached billions 
of dollars, but the innocence of the Thai Government and the 
avaricious greed of the multi-national corporation, caring not 
for the safety and the welfare of the host country or of its 
inhabitants, have combined to add insult to injury. 
The resulting injury left permanent scars not only in the Gulf 
of Thailand but also in the memories of Thai youths. In like 
circumstances, the Indian Government has been more successful 
in recovering substantial damages from Union Carbide in connection 
with the Bophol accident in the fall of 1984. 
Radio active fallouts from Chernobyl Nuclear accident in 1985 
is still unresolved. 
(c) Sources of Marine Pollution 
Nature has its own law to regulate the equilibrium of 
the environment around the globe, including the ecology of the 
sea and its surroundings. Pollution is invariably man-made. 
Pollution of the sea may originate from various sources. For 
all practical purposes, the following sources have contributed 
to marine pollution :-
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(1) pollution from land-based sources, such as from industrial 
waste, chemical discharges from factories into the river 
or directly into the sea; 
(2) pollution from the airspace above the ocean, such as 
(3) 
from the overflying aircraft, from radio-active fallouts, 
from nuclear explosion tests, or from acid rains and 
emission of fumes or smog, which could be traceable back 
to land-based sources; 
pollution from sea-going vessels, such as oil leaks, or 
r 
collision at sea, or accident of navigation, or pipelines 
leakages; 
(4) pollution from marine scientific researches, such as 
release or discharge of chemicals, 
or explosives; 
electric shock-waves, 
(5) pollution from sea-bed activities, such as exploration 
or exploitation activities, depth charges or blasts 
from rigs or platforms or artificial islands, or sub-
marines and under-water vehicles; or 
(6) pollution by dumping of toxic or nuclear wastes or chemical 
compounds, ultra hazadous substances or industrial discharges, 
(peace-time mining of the harbour, territorial sea or 
straits used for internatinal navigation requires special 
treatment, see the Corfu Channel Case, 1949, Nicaragua 
v. U.S.A. (1986) and the Gulf of Persia 1987). 
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(d) Special R~gimes for International Control of Marine Pollution 
Special conventional or treaty r~gimes have been in operation 
to regulate and abate marine pollution. The following deserve 
mention . 
(i) The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, 76] contains 
provisions designed to regulate marine pollution by 
States. 
Article 24 of the 1958 Convention imposes an obligation 
of conduct on States Parties "to draw up regulations 
to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil 
from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitat-
ion and exploration of the sea-bed and its subsoil, 
taking into account existing treaty provisions on the 
subject''. 77] 
A further obligation of conduct is imposed by Article 
25 of the 1958 Convention, requiring every State to 
"take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the 
dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any 
standards and regulations which may be formulated by 
the competent international organizations". 78] There 
is also an obligation to "cooperate with the competent 
international organization in taking 
prevention of pollution of the seas 
resulting from many activities with 
or other harmful agents." 79] 
measures for the 
or airspace above, 
radio-active materials 
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761 Geneva, April 29, 1958, in force September 30, 1962, the 
work of the International Law Commission, 3rd Edition, U.N., 
New York, 1980, pp. 147-155. 
771 Ibid., at p. 153. Reference to ''existing treaty provisions" 
is to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954, U.K.T.S. 56 (1958), Comnd. 
595; 327 U.N.T.S.3. There were as of 1982, 68 contracting 
Parties. 
781 Ibid. , at p. 153, Ar'ticie 25 (1). 
791 Article 25 (2), ibid., at p. l53 
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The Convention of 1958 seeks to regulate marine pollution 
exclusively from sources in the sea and airspace above, 
leaving the control of land-based sources to each State 
to undertake necessary regulatory measures. 
(ii) The Test Ban Treaty 1963; as seen earlier, has generated 
the effect of outlawing all nuclear explosion tests in 
(iii) 
the atmosphere over and above the ocean any where, thereby 
preventing radio-active fallouts and contamination of 
the ocean not occasioned by accident. 
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1969 81] entered into force in 1975 
with 49 contracting parties in 1982, is known as the 
''private law" Convention, inposing strict liability on 
the owner of any "sea-going vessel actually carrying 
oil in bulk as cargo". This Convention was supplemented 
by the 1971 Internatinal Convention on the Establishment 
of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution 
Damage. Brussels. 82] Victims may also have recourse 
to two compensation schemes set up by tanker owners -
The Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability 
for Oil Pollution 1969 (TOVALOP) 83] and the Contract 
Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for 
Oil Pollution 1971 (CRISTAL). 84] 
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80] U.N.T.S. 3 (1964), Cmnd. 2245; 480 U.N.T.S. 43, with 
111 Contracting Parties as of 1982. 
81] U.K.T.S. 106 (1975), Cmnd. 6183; 9 I.L.M.45. The Convention 
was amended by a 1976 Protocol Misc. 26 (1977). Cmnd. 
1028. On October 31, 1981, there were 14 Contracting 
States. 
82] 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972). On August 21, 1982, 11 Contracting 
States were Parties, in force 1978. 
83] 8 I.L.M. 497 (1969). 
84] 10 I.L.M. 137 (1971). 
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(iv) The International Convention Relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 
1269 85] is concerned with discharges resulting from 
accidents at sea in addition to the 1954 Convention 
86] which was concerned with operational discharges. 
The 1969 Convention was extended to cover ''substances 
other than oil which may reasonably be expected to result 
in major harmful consequences by the 1973 Protocol. 87] 
This Intervention Convention is knmm as the "public 
law" Convention side by side with the civil liability 
or "private law" Convention of the same year. It \iiJas 
prompted by the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967. Many 
such accidents have occurred in the Malacca Strait, 
the Showa Maru in 1975 and the Amoco Cadiz in 1979 off the 
coas·t of Brittany .. 88] 
(v) The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 89] has 
been influenced by a number of accidents at sea causing 
pollution for coastal States and strait States. The 
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85] U.K.T.S. (1975), Cmnd. 6056; 9 l.L.M. 25 (1969). ln force 
1975, on August 21, 1982, there were 42 Contrating Parties 
including the U.K. 
86] U.K.T.S. 50 (1958), Cmnd. 595; 327 U.N.T.S.3. 
87] Misc. 12 (1975 1 , Cmnd 6038; 13 l.L.l1.605 (1974). 
88] The Torrey Canyon, a Liberian "supertanker" carrying over 
119,000 tons of crude oil, negligently became stranded on 
the Seven Stones on the high seas off the coast of Cornwall. 
The Showa Maru, a Japanese "super ~anker" carrying nearly 
200,000 tons of crude oil hit uncharted rocks in the Malacca 
strai0 causing pollution affecting Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore. The Amoco Cadiz, a Liberian registered tanker 
owned by the U.S. company was wrecked on the Brittany Coast, 
losing most of 230,000 tons of crude oil. France now requires 
tankers to keep 7 miles from her coasts in innocent passage 
through territorial waters. 
89] The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 
1982, U.N. Publications, N.Y. 1983. 
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1982 Convention contains a large number of detailed provision 
on the protection of marine environment of global and 
regional cooperation, technical assistance, monitoring 
and environmental assessment, and the development and 
enforcement of international and national laws prevent-
ing pollution." 
Article 192 imposes on States the general obligation 
to protect and preserve the marine environment, and 
Article 193 subjects the sovereign rights of States 
to exploit natural resources pursuant to their environmental 
policies and in accordance with the duty under 
Article 192 to protect and preserve marine environment.90] 
In particular, Article 194 requires States to take all 
measures consistent with this Convention to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine envtronment 
from any source. 91] Measures shall include, inter alia, 
those designed to minimize to the fullest possible extent: 
(a) the release of toxic, harmful, or noxious substances, 
especially those which are persistent, from land-
based sources, from or through the atmosphere or 
by dumping; 
(b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures 
for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, 
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, prevent-
ing intentional and unintentional discharges, and 
regulating the design, construction, equipment, 
operation and manning of vessels; 
68/ ... 
91] See Articles 192 and 193, ibid., at p. 70, Part XII. 
92] See Article 194, especially paragraph 3, ibid., at p.70. 
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(c) pollution from installation and devices used in 
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources 
of the sea-bed and subsoil, in particular measures 
for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, 
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulat-
ing the design, construction, equipment, operation 
and manning of such installations or devices; 
(d) pollution from other installations and devices 
operating in the marine environment, in particular 
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with 
emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations 
at sea, and regulating the design, construction, 
equipment, operation and manning of such installations 
or devices. 
Article 235 (1) and (2) 92) impose on States liability 
for failure to fulfil international obligation concerning 
the protection and preservation of marine environment 
in accordance with international law. and the obligation 
to make available recourse for prompt and adequate 
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused 
by pollution of the marine environment by natural or 
juridical persons under their jurisdiction. 
2. THAILAND'S POSITIONS REGARDING MARINE POLLUTION 
As will be seen in greater details in specific papers 
concerning national legislation for implementation of the 
69/ ... 
92] See Article 235, Section 9. Responsibility and Liability, 
ibid., at p. 84. 
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LOS Convention provisions regarding protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, Thailand has recently recovered her 
appropriate place in the family of nations desiring to protect 
and preserve the environment, including marine environment. 93] 
Not unlike other countries, Thailand has had her shares of suffer-
ing as the result of marine pollution, especially in the Gulf 
of Thailand. Like her Asian neighbours, Thailand too will have 
to devise appropriate measures, legislative, procedural and 
practical to cope with the situation. Her obligations 
to protect and preserve the marine environment are far reaching 
and all embracing. In preparation for the treaty obligations. 
Thailand has to brace herself and be prepared to meet new challenge, 
to overcome past bitterness and prejudices. 
e.. 
A new legislative framwork has to be structured, anchored 
1\ 
in constitutional provisions, (1974), and the National Environ-
ment Policy Act to provide legal basis for the formulation of 
environmental policy and planning. Two bodies have been esta-
blished, viz., the National Environment and Service Development 
Board (NESDB) and its secretariat, the Office of National 
Environment Board (ONEB), with a legal sub-committee to prepare 
appropriate draft legislation for submission to parliament. 
A Series of legislative acts have been adopted to deal 
with marine pollution from land-based sources, 1 including the 
Public Health Act 1941 (PHA) to control the dumping of municipal 
waste, and the Factories Act 1969 (FAC) to set industrial effluent 
standards, and to regulate the treatment of industrial wastes, 
as well as agricultural chemicals such as fertilizers and toxic 
substances. 
93] 
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See, in particular, a paper by Mr. Panat Tasneeyanond 
on this topic. 
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Another series of legislations have been passed in respect 
of national control of marine pollution from sea-bed activities, 
in the form of the Petroleum Act 1971, establishing the Petroleum 
Authority of Thailand with an autonomous status, and with power 
to regulate offshore oil and gas drilling, including laying of 
gas pipelines in the Gulf of Thailand, and precautionary measures 
to prevent leakage. The Mineral Act 1967 was designed to regulate 
mining of all .mineral resources, including off-shore tin mining. 
Slime and tailings emitted by the off-shore mining operations 
are subject to ministerial regulationsand required to meet the 
standards set. 
In addition, there has been a recent legislation in 
the form of Regulation~on the Prevention and Abatement of Oil 
Pollution (RPAOP) to provide regulatory basis for evolving a 
national contingency plan for the abatement and monitoring control 
of oil spills resulting from the accidents of navigation, operational 
discharges of vessels, on a large scale and blasts orblown~-
out from off-shore drilling activities. 
There are some sporadic provisions in the Navigation 
in Thai Waters Act (NTWA) of 1913, concerning ocean dumping. 
Legislation in maritime law was long overdue, although reference 
to a specific maritime code was mentioned in the Civil and Commercial 
Code of Thailand. The National Research Counci~ Law Section~ 
did made recommendations as early as 1961 in support of the 
necessity for Thailand to have her ownnationalmaritime code, 
or the carriage of goods and passengers by sea. With the advent 
of Thai merchant marine and growing shipping activities now, 
such a code has come into existence. In this connexion, Thai 
vessel~ whether for commercial transport or fishing have to 
abide by international regulations and standards set by various 
internatinal organizations such as : IMCO, IMO and ILO. Thus, Thai 
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vessels must obey regulations regarding discharge of oil waste 
and cleaning of bunkers, or dumping of waste in the ocean. 
A curious incident took place off a Japaneseisland where the 
carcas of a dead elephant was dumped by a Thai vessel, the muni-
cipality of the Japanese island took great care and spent a large 
sum of money to remove the carcas and to clean the beach. Upon 
investigation, the matter was amicably settled as the Thai captain 
was able to certify the whereabout of the dump which was held 
to be outside the prohibited zone for dumping. The dead elephant 
was carried by the current eunexpectedly. A compromise solution 
was reached. 
Whatever the status of preparedness of the Thai Government 
to implement the new Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, 
there appear to be countless problem areas requiring legislative 
measures and adjustments of existing regulations. The attitude 
of the Thai Government in preparation for the ratification of 
the Convention must be one of cautious optimism. The marine 
environment constitutes the common heritage of mankind. As a 
law-abiding member of the world community, Thailand supports 
all forms of cooperative efforts and measures to prevent, reduce, 
abate and minimize as much as possible marine pollution every-
where, especially of course in the Gulf of Thailand and in the 
Anderman Sea, for which Thailand is directly responsible as coastal 
State. 
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